South Sudan: Kiir Undermines South Sudan 2018 Peace Deal, Election Doubts

• South Sudan's cabinet approved legal amendments for December 2026 elections, despite a UN report citing a lack of safeguards for credible polls.
• President Salva Kiir has systematically undermined the 2018 R-ARCSS peace deal through unilateral cabinet dismissals, replacing opposition lawmakers, and delaying security reforms.
• First Vice-President Riek Machar was placed under house arrest in March 2025 and faces treason charges, with President Kiir resisting international calls for his release.
• Kiir unilaterally amended the 2018 peace deal on July 22, removing preconditions for elections like a national census and new constitution, and reducing the agreement's legal supremacy.
• These actions heighten the risk of renewed large-scale conflict in South Sudan, potentially dismantling the political settlement established by the 2018 peace agreement.

President Salva Kiir Mayardit has taken a series of unilateral actions that have systematically undermined the power-sharing arrangements stipulated by this agreement.

South Sudan's cabinet recently moved to approve legal amendments intended to pave the way for national elections scheduled for December 2026. This development comes amidst significant concerns regarding the country's readiness for credible polls, an assessment underscored by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan. Just one day prior to the cabinet's decision, on September 10, the UN body reported a critical absence of essential safeguards and conditions necessary for peaceful and legitimate elections, a finding the South Sudanese government promptly dismissed.

This marks a continuation of a prolonged transitional period for South Sudan, which has not held national elections since gaining independence in 2011. The nation's political landscape has been characterized by recurring cycles of armed conflict and persistent political stalemates. The initial elections, planned for 2015, were postponed following the outbreak of civil war in 2013, and since then, polls have been delayed a total of five times. Current assessments suggest that significant political and technical challenges continue to impede the possibility of credible elections that could bring an end to this extended transitional phase.

The stability of South Sudan's transitional government is fundamentally anchored in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), a crucial accord designed to prevent large-scale violence. However, over the past year, President Salva Kiir Mayardit has taken a series of unilateral actions that have systematically undermined the power-sharing arrangements stipulated by this agreement. These actions include the dismissal of cabinet members without consultation, the replacement of opposition lawmakers, and significant delays in implementing critical security sector reforms.

Central to these developments was President Kiir's decision to place First Vice-President Riek Machar under house arrest in March 2025. This occurred after an attack on a military base by the White Army militia, a group predominantly composed of members from Machar's Nuer ethnic group. The government subsequently accused Machar of orchestrating the assault, leading to treason charges against him and several close associates. Despite international appeals for Machar's release, President Kiir has resisted, maintaining Machar's detention. Machar remains a formidable political figure with extensive ethnic, military, and political networks, capable of mobilizing substantial opposition, particularly in the Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei regions. His potential release before elections could pose a significant challenge to Kiir's aspirations for an extended term.

Further demonstrating a pattern of unilateral actions, President Kiir has initiated several reshuffles within the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity, directly contravening the power-sharing provisions of the 2018 R-ARCSS. These maneuvers have seen the systematic removal of members from Machar's faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) from government positions. Their replacements have come from a splinter faction of the SPLM/A-IO led by Peace Building Minister Stephen Par Kuol, a group allied with President Kiir and supportive of the current electoral process, despite its perceived flaws.

In a move that directly violates the 2018 agreement, President Kiir also unilaterally amended the deal to eliminate what he termed 'legal obstacles' to conducting elections. The amendments, enacted on July 22, removed critical preconditions for holding elections, including the requirement for a national census and the establishment of a new constitution. Additionally, these changes sought to diminish the overall supremacy of the 2018 agreement within South Sudan's legal framework, thereby enabling the government to selectively implement its provisions. These actions collectively represent a significant erosion of the foundational legal and political framework intended to guide the country's transition.

The political rivalry between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice-President Riek Machar has historically been a defining characteristic of South Sudan's post-independence conflicts and peace processes, often overshadowing deeper issues such as the militarization of politics and elite bargaining. While periods of rapprochement, particularly following the 2018 agreement, did contribute to a reduction in bloodshed and fostered some degree of stability, the international community's attention has since shifted to other intensifying conflicts, including those in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan. This diminished international focus has, in turn, weakened the external pressure necessary to ensure the full implementation of the R-ARCSS.

The current trajectory, marked by President Kiir's unilateral actions and the ongoing detention of Riek Machar, carries a substantial risk of plunging South Sudan back into widespread conflict, reminiscent of the violence seen in 2013. The country's militarized and fragile political environment makes it particularly vulnerable to such a scenario, especially when considering recent electoral precedents in neighboring nations. For instance, Tanzania's October 2025 elections and Uganda's January 2026 elections were both marred by violent repression and the detention of key opposition candidates. A similar approach in South Sudan could dismantle the political settlement that ended the 2018 conflict, leading to severe instability.

Lawyers and compliance officers should assess heightened political risk and potential for renewed conflict in South Sudan, advising clients on the implications of President Kiir's unilateral undermining of the R-ARCSS peace deal and electoral law amendments on investment stability, contract enforceability, and human rights compliance.

Source: Original reporting via the provided source material