South Sudan Elections: UN Commission Cites Lack of Safeguards

Attention should shift to preserving the peace deal that underpins the current government and is key to averting large-scale violence. South Sudan's cabinet last week approved legal amendments in preparation for the December 2026 elections. The day before, on 10 September, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan reported that the country lacked 'many of the safeguards and conditions for peaceful and credible polls' - an assessment the government swiftly rejected . South Sudan hasn't held national elections since its 2011 independence due to recurring cycles of armed conflict and political stalling. Now, major political and technical problems again preclude credible polls that would have ended the prolonged transition. Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines The country's first elections, scheduled for 2015, were delayed after civil war broke out in 2013. Since then, polls have been postponed five times. The first peace deal lasted barely a year and was followed by the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice-President Riek Machar's political rivalry has characterised post-independence conflicts and peace processes, often obscuring the crisis' underlying triggers, such as militarisation of politics and elite bargaining. Periods of rapprochement, such as after the 2018 agreement, helped reduce bloodshed and ushered in some stability. But as other conflicts intensified, including in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, South Sudan's transition receded from international attention, weakening the pressure needed to push for the agreement's implementation. Over the past year, Kiir has undermined the accord's power-sharing arrangement through unilateral cabinet dismissals, the replacement of opposition lawmakers, and delays in security sector reforms. Considering that the country's transitional government is anchored on the agreement, abandoning it would dismantle the political settlement that ended the conflict in 2018. Kiir's first move was to place Machar under house arrest in March 2025 after an attack on a military base by the White Army militia, who predominantly belong to the Nuer, Machar's ethnic group. The government accused Machar of orchestrating the attack, and he, along with several close associates, faces treason charges. Kiir has resisted international calls to release Machar. The vice-president remains a powerful and aggrieved political actor with deep ethnic, military and political networks capable of mobilising significant opposition, particularly in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei. If released before elections, he could threaten Kiir's bid to extend his term. Tanzania and Uganda held elections in October 2025 and January 2026, respectively, amid violent repression, with key opposition candidates detained. A similar approach in South Sudan's militarised and fragile political environment could plunge the country back into renewed conflict reminiscent of 2013. Since Machar's arrest, Kiir has made several unilateral reshuffles in the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity, contrary to the 2018 deal's power-sharing provisions. The administration has purged Machar's wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) from government and replaced it with members of Peace Building Minister Stephen Par Kuol's SPLM/A-IO splinter faction. The faction is allied with Kiir and supports the current flawed electoral process . Kiir has also unilaterally amended the 2018 deal to remove legal 'obstacles' to conducting elections, thereby violating the agreement. The 22 July amendments removed the preconditions for holding elections, including a national census and a new constitution. He also sought to reduce the deal's supremacy in the country's legal system, thereby enabling the government to implement its provisions selectively. Machar'