South Sudan: R-ARCSS Election Conditions Unmet, Risks Instability

• South Sudan risks renewed instability by proceeding with elections without fulfilling key constitutional and security prerequisites, mirroring Sudan's 1980s mistakes.
• The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) mandates five pillars, two of which are electoral law harmonization and refugee repatriation.
• South Sudan lacks a complete national voter roll, and 2026 amendments to electoral laws bypassed the required RJMEC endorsement.
• Millions of South Sudanese remain displaced, with over 420,000 newly displaced in 2026, while the Special Fund for Reconstruction remains unoperationalized.
• Ignoring these R-ARCSS unfulfilled pillars could lead to national fragmentation into three separate entities, threatening the country's survival as a single state.

Without the foundational governance structures and conditions stipulated in the R-ARCSS firmly in place, the nation faces a tangible risk of fracturing along its historical regional divisions.

South Sudan currently faces a critical juncture, with its leadership contemplating general elections despite significant unaddressed constitutional and security requirements. This situation bears a striking resemblance to the catastrophic errors made by Khartoum in the 1980s, which ultimately led to prolonged conflict and the eventual dissolution of a unified Sudan. Proceeding with polls under these circumstances risks plunging the young nation into renewed instability and potential fragmentation.

In the mid-1980s, Sudan was embroiled in the Second Sudanese Civil War, with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and Dr. John Garang de Mabior leading the southern resistance. Following the military coup that deposed President Gaafar Nimeiry in April 1985, influential northern sectarian parties, including Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, aggressively advocated for immediate national elections in April 1986.

Despite these calls, former Vice President Joseph Lagu, speaking from exile in February 1986, issued a stark warning to the transitional government. He urged a postponement of the elections until fundamental national grievances were adequately addressed. Lagu, supported by the SPLM/A and various Southern political coalitions, presented three key arguments against holding premature elections. However, Khartoum disregarded these warnings and proceeded with the April 1986 polls, notably suspending voting in 37 of the 68 Southern constituencies. This decision resulted in a government that lacked legitimacy in the South, fueled a brutal war claiming millions of lives, and culminated in Sudan's eventual breakup in 2011.

South Sudan appears to be replicating the very missteps that plagued Khartoum decades ago. The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), formally signed on September 12, 2018, was designed to conclude the country's transitional period with general elections as its final, pivotal milestone. However, various monitoring bodies, including the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), alongside political analysts, have consistently highlighted that five mandatory prerequisites outlined in the R-ARCSS remain unfulfilled, casting a shadow over the legitimacy and viability of impending elections.

Among these critical R-ARCSS unfulfilled pillars are the harmonization of electoral laws and the establishment of institutional readiness. Article 1.20, encompassing sub-articles 1.20.1 through 1.20.12, specifically governs national elections. It mandates the alignment of the Political Parties Act (Article 1.20.1) and the National Elections Act (Article 1.20.6) with the existing constitutional framework. Furthermore, it explicitly requires the publication of a verified voter register a full six months before any polls are conducted, as stipulated in Article 1.20.10. Presently, South Sudan lacks a complete national voter roll, a fundamental requirement. Compounding this issue, amendments made in September 2026 to the National Elections Act controversially reduced the voter register publication window from the mandated six months to just three months. Crucially, these amendments bypassed the two-thirds RJMEC endorsement that Article 8.4 of the agreement requires for any alterations to its provisions, raising serious concerns about adherence to established legal processes.

Another significant unfulfilled pillar concerns the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. Chapter III of the R-ARCSS, specifically Articles 3.1.1.6 and 3.2.1, guarantees the safe return of displaced citizens and calls for the establishment of a Special Fund for Reconstruction (SRF) to facilitate the rebuilding of war-affected communities. Despite these provisions, millions of South Sudanese continue to reside in refugee camps and domestic displacement sites. The situation was exacerbated by over 420,000 newly displaced individuals in 2026 alone, highlighting the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Disturbingly, the Special Fund for Reconstruction remains entirely unoperationalized, leaving critical rebuilding efforts stalled and displaced populations in limbo.

The decision to proceed with elections while bypassing these fundamental R-ARCSS unfulfilled pillars is unlikely to foster genuine democracy. Instead, it risks formalizing an indefinite transitional state and could potentially ignite renewed civil conflict. The historical precedent of Khartoum's failure to address constitutional and security grievances between 1986 and 2005 ultimately led to the destruction of a united Sudan. Similarly, Juba's current disregard for the provisions of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan poses a grave threat to the very survival of South Sudan as a cohesive state.

Without the foundational governance structures and conditions stipulated in the R-ARCSS firmly in place, the nation faces a tangible risk of fracturing along its historical regional divisions. This could lead to the emergence of three distinct entities: the republics of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria. This dire warning is not based on mere pessimism but is firmly rooted in the undeniable lessons of history and the explicit legal framework established by the R-ARCSS. Should South Sudan’s leaders fail to implement the agreement before proceeding to the ballot, the consequences for national unity and stability could be irreversible.

Lawyers and compliance officers with clients operating or considering operations in South Sudan must assess the significantly elevated political and legal risks associated with the impending elections, given the government's failure to implement critical R-ARCSS provisions, including electoral law harmonization and refugee repatriation. This non-compliance signals potential for renewed instability, impacting investment security, contract enforceability, and compliance with international standards.

Source: Original reporting via expert legal commentary