DR Congo: M23 Rebels Finance War Through Illegal Taxation, Mineral Extraction

Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo — "They have methodically consolidated a de facto, deeply illegal, parallel administration." Rwanda-backed M23 rebels have embedded themselves into the local economy of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, using revenue from taxes and minerals to pay fighters, maintain an administration, and consolidate territory. But the system faces constraints: The rebels and their backers are extracting revenue from an economy weakened by war, disrupted trade, and the collapse of formal banking, while lacking the financial infrastructure needed to revive it. "The M23 spoke of liberation, but economically the situation is even worse than before," said a shop owner in Goma, the largest city in eastern DRC. "The airport is closed, there are no banks, businesses have shut, people have no money to buy... we are just surviving." Follow us on WhatsApp | LinkedIn for the latest headlines The M23 began its latest insurgency in 2021, seizing large tracts of territory before capturing the two main cities in the east - Goma and Bukavu - in early 2025. It now acts as a de facto governing power in an area where millions of people live. Taxation forms the backbone of its financing system, extending from local companies and markets to transporters, cross-border businesses, ordinary residents, and even humanitarian organisations . To cement its system and have greater autonomy in areas it controls, the rebels have also set up a parallel financial system, though these efforts have not yet proved especially successful. Minerals like gold and coltan constitute another important part of the M23's war chest, with lucrative mining sites and transport corridors subject to taxation and resource extraction. Many of these minerals are smuggled across the border to the M23's chief backer, Rwanda, which has thousands of soldiers on Congolese soil fighting alongside and commanding rebel operations. The flow of minerals and other goods through Rwanda and onto global markets has intensified scrutiny of international complicity in the violence, and the wider exploitation of Congolese resources - a pattern stretching from Belgian colonial rule to today's extractive capitalism. "Criminal governance" Much of the conflict in eastern DRC traces back to the 1990s after the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. When Hutu genocidaires fled into eastern DRC, Rwanda's new government followed them, backing rebels who challenged and toppled Congolese administrations. The Tutsi-led M23 - the latest in a long line of Rwanda-backed insurgents - initially justified its rebellion by accusing the Congolese government of failing to implement a previous peace deal with the group, and by citing threats to local Tutsi communities. While denying direct support to the M23, Kigali justifies the group's fight on the grounds that genocidaires remain active in eastern DRC. Critics, however, say it is using the threat as a pretext for territorial expansion and economic exploitation. As the insurgency has expanded, the M23 has developed national ambitions under a political wing, the Congo River Alliance (AFC in French). They have called for the removal of Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and threatened to march on Kinshasa. The rebels have "methodically consolidated a de facto, deeply illegal, parallel administration", said Zobel Behalal, an expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and a former member of the UN experts panel on DRC. Behalal told The New Humanitarian that the "forms of criminal governance" created by the M23/AFC leave civilians with no choice but to finance the group, despite it being under UN and other international sanctions. Much of the financing takes the form of taxes. Every day in rebel areas, trucks carrying goods pay fees at checkpoints, as do motorbike taxis moving between towns. Businesses, from shops and warehouses to informal traders, are also taxed. Cross-border trade is another lucrative