DR Congo: Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism Deployed in Eastern Region

The first deployment of the monitoring mechanism is positive, but current conflict conditions should temper expectations. The first mission to verify the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ceasefire agreed in November 2025 began its work in South Kivu on 24 August. But can facts be established in a fragmented and polarised context? And can the mission's findings change how warring parties assess the costs, risks and benefits of continued fighting? The Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) was activated following August talks in Switzerland between the DRC government and Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23. Qatar, the United States (US) and African Union (AU) helped mediate. Keep up with the latest headlines on WhatsApp | LinkedIn Established through the Doha negotiations between the DRC and AFC/M23, the EJVM+ reports to the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism, which supervises implementation and aims to create conditions for de-escalation and dialogue. Kickstarting the EJVM+ is one of the most tangible signs of progress under the Doha framework, providing a way to verify alleged ceasefire violations by the DRC government and AFC/M23. However current conflict conditions should temper expectations. Both the government and AFC/M23 continue to contest territory through drone strikes, recruitment and alliances with other armed groups. Belligerents often use ceasefires to reposition or rearm forces, establish new 'facts' on the ground and consolidate territorial control. The ceasefire also fails to separate forces and reduce the risk of renewed fighting, which could have been done by providing clear ceasefire lines, force withdrawals, cantonments and buffer zones. Choosing South Kivu's Minembwe for EJVM+'s first verification mission is significant as the area embodies many of the complexities that make ceasefire monitoring in eastern DRC difficult. First is worsening violence. Following M23's withdrawal from Uvira, the DRC government launched an offensive towards Minembwe in early 2026, trapping citizens, restricting humanitarian access and the movement of goods. In early July, rebels consolidated control in the highlands, where fighting continues. Second, the conflict does not involve only the government and AFC/M23. In Minembwe, the armed movement of the Banyamulenge - a Congolese Tutsi community whose citizenship and security have been contested - has aligned with AFC/M23, while the Congolese army collaborates with fragmented Wazalendo groups. Heightened tensions between Burundi and Rwanda also make ceasefire monitoring difficult. With Burundian troops deployed to back Kinshasa, and Rwanda supporting AFC/M23, the war risks escalating longstanding rivalries and fuelling proxy conflicts, including through increased Rwandan support for Burundian armed groups. A central EJVM+ weakness is that its scope is limited to a two-party ceasefire in a conflict involving regional actors and multiple armed groups that rarely consider themselves bound by such a ceasefire. Fragmentation of diplomatic efforts is another complicating factor. Alongside the Doha process, the US is mediating between the DRC government and Rwanda. As the implementation of that peace agreement stalls, Rwanda's military involvement in eastern DRC, along with the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), has continued. Developments arising from these parallel tracks are beyond the EJVM+'s remit. Rebel withdrawals from Uvira and the Ruzizi Plain in January and May resulted from US diplomatic pressure rather than the Doha negotiations and lacked neutral verification. Although it has been suggested that the EJVM+ mandate be extended to the Washington Accords, the ceasefire excludes the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the disarmament of the FDLR. That means the EJVM+ cannot verify those commitments and lacks direct links to the mechanisms overseeing the DRC-Rwanda agreement. This reflects a broader problem: fragmented