Ninth Circuit: Abdul Kareem Material Support Retrial Ordered in ISIS Plot

• The Ninth Circuit ordered a retrial for Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem on one count of his 2016 conviction.
• The reversed count was conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.
• The court found insufficient evidence that Kareem intended to act under the direction or control of ISIS.
• The ruling clarifies that ideological sympathy alone does not establish the necessary intent for material support charges.
• Kareem had supplied weapons to two individuals who carried out a 2015 attack in Texas.

The court emphasized that for a conviction on this charge, prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant intended to engage in 'coordinated actions that integrate [him] into [the] organization’s operations.'

The Ninth Circuit has mandated a new trial for Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem, a Phoenix resident previously convicted for his involvement in a 2015 terrorist plot. The appellate court's decision, issued on Friday, specifically overturned one of the five counts from Kareem's 2016 conviction: conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. This ruling means that while his other convictions stand, Kareem will face a retrial solely on the charge related to supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The court found that the government failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem's actual intent to act on behalf of ISIS when he supplied weapons to two individuals who later carried out an attack in Texas. This significant development in the US v Kareem Ninth Circuit case underscores the stringent requirements for proving direct intent in such complex terrorism-related prosecutions. The Ninth Circuit Abdul Kareem material support retrial will now proceed, focusing on this specific aspect of the original charges.

Central to the Ninth Circuit's decision was the interpretation of what constitutes "material support" under the direction of a foreign terrorist organization. U.S. Circuit Judge Salvador Mendoza Jr., writing for the majority and joined by U.S. Circuit Judge Roopali Desai, articulated that mere ideological alignment or sympathy with a group's objectives is insufficient to establish the requisite intent. The 33-page opinion clarified that actions stemming from an individual's independent inspiration by an organization's ideology, without evidence of a knowing agreement to provide services or an intent for co-conspirators to operate under the organization's control, do not meet the legal threshold for material support.

The court emphasized that for a conviction on this charge, prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant intended to engage in 'coordinated actions that integrate [him] into [the] organization’s operations.' The majority concluded that the evidence presented by the government, even when viewed favorably for the prosecution, did not show that Kareem intended to join a scheme where he or his co-conspirators would receive directions from or coordinate with ISIS personnel. This ruling sets a high bar for proving material support foreign terrorist organization intent, distinguishing between personal ideological conviction and active participation under a terrorist group's command.

Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem's original 2016 conviction stemmed from his role in providing three rifles, three handguns, and 1,500 rounds of ammunition to his roommates, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi. In May 2015, Simpson and Soofi traveled from their Phoenix residence to Garland, Texas, where they initiated a shooting attack at a "Draw Muhammad" cartoon contest. An undercover police officer intervened, fatally shooting both assailants after they wounded a security guard in the leg. Shortly before the attack, Simpson had publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group via a tweet.

During Kareem's trial, prosecutors presented evidence that he had resided with Simpson and Soofi since 2014 and that the trio had consumed and discussed extremist media, including ISIS propaganda videos. A former roommate also testified that Kareem had declared himself "part of ISIS." The prosecution argued that Kareem's close association with the attackers, his exposure to propaganda, and Simpson's public pledge to ISIS were sufficient to prove his intent to provide material support. However, the Ninth Circuit found this evidence inadequate, noting that Simpson's pledge reflected only his personal devotion and that no proof existed that Kareem was aware of any agreement between Simpson and ISIS, or that Kareem himself had agreed to serve as "personnel" for the group.

U.S. Circuit Judge Daniel P. Collins, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's strict interpretation of "service" to a foreign terrorist organization. Judge Collins argued that there was no material distinction between directly serving a group and acting in alignment with its core mission, challenging the notion that "service" necessarily requires coordinated actions integrating an individual into the organization's operations. This divergence highlights the complex legal debate surrounding the scope of material support charges.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in the Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem appeal, particularly the Judge Salvador Mendoza Jr opinion, carries significant implications for future prosecutions involving ISIS terrorism conviction appeals and similar charges. It reinforces that ideological sympathy, however strong, does not automatically equate to the specific intent required for a material support conviction. This precedent will likely compel prosecutors to present more direct evidence of coordination or agreement with a foreign terrorist organization, rather than relying primarily on a defendant's exposure to extremist ideology or personal declarations of allegiance.

This ruling clarifies the high bar for proving intent in 'material support for a foreign terrorist organization' cases, emphasizing that ideological sympathy alone is insufficient. Defense attorneys can cite this precedent to argue against convictions where direct coordination or agreement with the terrorist organization is not explicitly proven, while prosecutors must ensure evidence demonstrates actual intent to provide services under the organization's direction.

Source: Original reporting via Courthouse News Service