Lord Justice Singh: Common Law First for Fundamental Rights in UK
Case Law

Lord Justice Singh: Common Law First for Fundamental Rights in UK

United Kingdom·Briefly Analysis⏱️ 4 min read

Summary

  • Lord Justice Sir Rabinder Singh delivered a lecture advocating for common law as the primary starting point for fundamental rights protection.
  • Supreme Court judges, including Lord Reed and Lord Briggs, support prioritizing common law over the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).
  • Lord Reed stated in R (Osborn) v Parole Board that the HRA does not supersede common law or statutory human rights protections.
  • Lord Briggs emphasized that common law typically provides the cause of action, with the HRA ensuring Convention compliance.
  • This judicial trend suggests that common law principles may often make direct reliance on the HRA unnecessary for rights claims.

A Shifting Paradigm in UK Rights Protection

This collective judicial emphasis from figures like Sir Rabinder Singh, Lord Reed, and Lord Briggs signals a significant reorientation in how human rights claims are approached in the UK, advocating for a return to common law principles as the foundational starting point for legal analysis.

Lord Justice Sir Rabinder Singh recently delivered a significant lecture in Edinburgh, focusing on the evolving landscape of fundamental rights protection within the common law framework. Speaking at the Faculty of Advocates in Parliament House on November 19, 2026, his address underscored a growing consensus among legal scholars and the judiciary: that the common law should serve as the initial point of reference when addressing human rights issues, rather than immediately turning to the explicit provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This perspective suggests that, in many instances, a comprehensive examination of common law principles might render a direct reliance on the HRA unnecessary.

This emerging judicial philosophy has been championed by several prominent figures within the Supreme Court over the past decade. Notably, the current President, Lord Reed, and his designated successor, Lord Briggs, have consistently articulated that the HRA should not typically be considered the primary legal foundation when questions of human rights arise. Their collective emphasis points to a re-evaluation of the HRA's role, positioning it as a complementary, rather than foundational, instrument in the UK's legal system for safeguarding individual liberties.

The Supreme Court's Stance on the HRA

Lord Reed, in particular, articulated this nuanced position in the landmark case of R (Osborn) v Parole Board. He clarified that while the Human Rights Act holds unquestionable importance, it does not inherently supersede the existing protections for human rights already enshrined in common law or other statutory provisions. Furthermore, Lord Reed stressed that the HRA was not intended to establish a distinct body of law derived solely from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Instead, he affirmed that human rights continue to be safeguarded by the UK's domestic legal framework, which is then interpreted and developed in harmony with the HRA when such an approach is deemed appropriate.

This judicial interpretation highlights a crucial distinction: the HRA acts as an interpretive tool and a mechanism for ensuring Convention rights compliance within the UK common law system, rather than an entirely new and independent source of rights. It reinforces the idea that the deep-rooted traditions of UK common law human rights protection remain paramount, with the HRA serving to enhance and align these protections with international standards, rather than replacing them.

Common Law as the Primary Cause of Action

Further solidifying this perspective, Lord Briggs delivered a lecture last year to the NGO Justice, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Human Rights Act. Titled "Protecting human rights: the common law as the starting point," his address echoed and expanded upon the sentiment expressed by Lord Reed. Lord Briggs explicitly stated that it is typically the common law that furnishes the underlying cause of action in human rights cases. While acknowledging the HRA's role in ensuring that these common law causes of action are compliant with Convention rights, he underscored the inherent strength and breadth of common law protection.

Lord Briggs' remarks reinforce the notion that the UK's common law frequently offers robust avenues for the protection of fundamental rights, often preceding and sometimes even obviating the need for direct invocation of the HRA. This collective judicial emphasis from figures like Sir Rabinder Singh, Lord Reed, and Lord Briggs signals a significant reorientation in how human rights claims are approached in the UK, advocating for a return to common law principles as the foundational starting point for legal analysis.

Practical Implications

Lawyers and compliance officers should note the evolving judicial approach in the UK, where courts are increasingly prioritizing common law principles as the starting point for fundamental rights claims, potentially making the Human Rights Act 1998 a secondary or even unnecessary consideration. This shift necessitates a re-evaluation of litigation strategies, emphasizing robust common law arguments in human rights cases.

Source

Source: Original reporting via Lord Justice Singh's lecture.

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