Karnataka HC: Quashes BNS 353(2) FIR Against Narayanaswamy, Srivatsa

• The Karnataka High Court quashed an FIR against political leaders T Narayanaswamy and T S Srivatsa.
• The FIR concerned their statements opposing proposed Scheduled Tribe (ST) status and reservation for the Kuruba community.
• Justice M Nagaprasanna ruled on August 20 that the allegations did not meet the criteria for an offense under Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).
• The court determined that merely opposing a proposed reservation policy does not, by itself, constitute a criminal offense.
• The ruling clarifies the legal threshold for criminal liability related to public statements in political discourse under BNS Section 353(2) and former IPC Section 505.

The court firmly held that such opposition, in and of itself, cannot be construed as an offense under the legal framework.

The Karnataka High Court recently intervened to quash a First Information Report (FIR) that had been lodged against two prominent political figures: T Narayanaswamy, also known as Chalavadi Narayanaswamy, who serves as the Leader of Opposition in the Karnataka Legislative Council, and T S Srivatsa, a BJP Member of Legislative Assembly. The FIR stemmed from public statements made by both individuals expressing their opposition to a proposed initiative to grant Scheduled Tribe (ST) status and associated reservations to the Kuruba community.

Justice M Nagaprasanna delivered the order on August 20, ruling in the case of T Narayanaswamy @ Chalavadi Narayanaswamy V. State of Karnataka. The court's decision hinged on the finding that the allegations contained within the complaint, even when considered at their face value, did not sufficiently establish the necessary elements of an offense under Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). This section, which has replaced Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), pertains to statements conducing to public mischief.

The prosecution had alleged that Mr. Narayanaswamy made his contentious remarks from his office, while Mr. Srivatsa's statements were reportedly made in Mysuru and subsequently disseminated on social media platforms. Beyond merely opposing the reservation demand, the FIR also claimed that the BJP leaders had made derogatory statements targeting the Chief Minister and had humiliated members of the Kuruba community. However, the High Court found these allegations, as presented, did not meet the legal threshold for a criminal offense under the specified provision.

Central to the High Court's ruling was a critical interpretation of the scope of Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which mirrors the provisions of the erstwhile Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Nagaprasanna explicitly stated that the petitioners' actions amounted to nothing more than expressing opposition to a proposed reservation policy. The court firmly held that such opposition, in and of itself, cannot be construed as an offense under the legal framework.

The judgment underscored that mere participation in ongoing discussions or expressing a contrary viewpoint on a policy matter does not automatically constitute a criminal act. The court's observation that "Talks that were going on at that point in time, this by itself would not make an offence under Section 353(2) of the BNS / Section 505 of the IPC" highlights a crucial distinction. It clarifies that engaging in political discourse, even when it involves disagreeing with or criticizing proposed government actions or community demands, falls within the bounds of permissible expression, provided it does not cross into specific criminal conduct as defined by law.

This ruling by the Karnataka High Court carries significant implications for the landscape of political speech and public discourse, particularly concerning contentious policy debates like reservation. By quashing the FIR against Chalavadi Narayanaswamy and T S Srivatsa, the court has effectively clarified the threshold for criminal liability under Section 353(2) BNS, and by extension, its predecessor, Section 505 IPC, regarding public statements opposing proposed reservation policies.

The decision reinforces the principle that expressing opposition to a policy, even if critical or strongly worded, may not automatically constitute a criminal offense. This provides an important precedent for legal professionals, suggesting that mere disagreement with government proposals or community demands, without other aggravating factors, might not be sufficient to warrant criminal prosecution. For lawyers, this ruling offers a valuable reference point for defending clients accused of similar speech-related offenses in the context of political debate, emphasizing that the bar for criminal culpability in such matters is set higher than simply expressing an unpopular or critical opinion.

This ruling clarifies the threshold for criminal liability under Section 353(2) BNS (and previously Section 505 IPC) for public statements opposing proposed reservation policies. Lawyers should note that mere opposition, even if critical, may not constitute an offense, providing a precedent for defending clients accused of similar speech-related offenses in political discourse.

Source: Original reporting via Bar and Bench