AG Refuses Criminal Contempt: Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar

• The Attorney-General for India refused consent for criminal contempt proceedings against Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar.
• The refusal was based on the Supreme Court already being seized of the matter in a pending contempt case.
• Advocate Brajesh Singh sought the consent, alleging Delhi Police harassed journalists on October 11, 2026, defying a Supreme Court order.
• The Supreme Court had directed that lawyers, journalists, and other professionals should not be hindered in their duties.
• The Attorney-General stated that multiple contempt proceedings are unnecessary when the Court is already addressing the issue.

By declining consent, the Attorney-General has effectively prevented the proliferation of parallel legal actions concerning the same alleged contempt, thereby streamlining the judicial process and respecting the Supreme Court's ongoing jurisdiction.

The Attorney-General for India recently declined a request to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against Delhi Police Commissioner Anurag Kumar. This refusal came in response to an application filed by Advocate Brajesh Singh, who sought consent to pursue action against the Commissioner for alleged defiance of Supreme Court directives. The Attorney-General cited the ongoing engagement of the Supreme Court with the very same issue in existing contempt proceedings as the primary reason for withholding consent.

Advocate Singh's application stemmed from incidents on October 11, 2026, when the Delhi Police reportedly intercepted, harassed, and detained approximately a dozen journalists in Central Delhi. These actions, according to Singh, directly contravened an order issued by a Supreme Court Bench earlier that day. The Court, convening for a special hearing, had explicitly directed that "Lawyers, journalists and other professionals shall not be hindered in discharge of their professional duties in any manner whatsoever." The Attorney-General's decision effectively halts a parallel contempt action, reinforcing the principle that redundant legal processes are to be avoided when the apex court is already actively addressing the matter.

The request for criminal contempt proceedings was made under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which governs the procedure for initiating such actions. Specifically, Advocate Singh invoked Section 15(1)(b) of the Act, read with Section 2(c) and Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975. This legal framework stipulates that while the Supreme Court can initiate contempt on its own motion, or through the Attorney General or Solicitor General, any other individual requires the written consent of the Attorney General or Solicitor General to proceed.

The Supreme Court was already seized of the matter in CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No. 63801/2026, where it had issued an order on October 11, 2026. This order, delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana, arose from an urgent hearing concerning alleged violations of a prior order dated October 9, 2026, and claims of illegal detention of numerous individuals in Delhi on October 10, 2026. During this hearing, the Solicitor General had provided an assurance that professionals, including lawyers and journalists, would not face impediments in their duties. Advocate Singh's letter, dated October 12, 2026, addressed to Attorney General R. Venkataramani, specifically sought consent to initiate proceedings against Commissioner Anurag Kumar for "blatant, deliberate, and willful defiance" of these unequivocal directives.

In his refusal, the Attorney-General for India explicitly stated that since the Supreme Court was "already dealing with the subject through Contempt Proceedings, multiple contempt proceedings are unnecessary." He further noted that he did "not see any special reason to consent to the current request." This decision underscores the discretionary power vested in the Attorney-General under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, particularly in situations where the highest court is already actively engaged in adjudicating the same issue.

By declining consent, the Attorney-General has effectively prevented the proliferation of parallel legal actions concerning the same alleged contempt, thereby streamlining the judicial process and respecting the Supreme Court's ongoing jurisdiction. This outcome highlights the importance of understanding procedural overlaps in contempt litigation, indicating that parallel contempt actions are unlikely to receive AG consent if the primary court is already addressing the issue.

This decision clarifies the Attorney-General's discretionary power under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, particularly regarding the refusal to grant consent for criminal contempt proceedings when the Supreme Court is already actively seized of the same matter. Lawyers should note that parallel contempt actions are unlikely to receive AG consent if the primary court is addressing the issue, emphasizing the importance of understanding procedural overlaps in contempt litigation.

Source: Original reporting via legal news outlet