South Africa Gazettes New Electoral Code Against Disinformation

Public confidence in identifying disinformation is falling just as AI and hyper-local campaigning make election manipulation harder to detect. South Africa's new code of conduct against election disinformation is a vital step ahead of what could be the country's most fiercely contested local polls on 4 November. The Electoral Code of Conduct Countering Disinformation in the Local Government Elections (Disinformation Code ) was gazetted by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) on 4 September. These legal provisions are badly needed, considering that citizens are becoming less confident in their ability to identify fake news. Keep up with the latest headlines on WhatsApp | LinkedIn According to the IEC's latest Voter Participation Survey, the proportion of respondents who describe themselves as confident in recognising fake news declined from 62% in 2023 to 52% in 2025/26. Yet only 18% say they regularly verify election-related information before liking, sharing or reposting it. As the polls approach, the survey shows that traditional media remains highly influential, with 71% of respondents relying on television and 38% on radio for voting information. At the same time, social media is gaining ground - 23% cite it as a source of election-related information, up from 8% in 2021. While social media may not be a leading source of election information, South Africans spend a lot of time online. In 2025, an average of nine hours and 37 minutes online daily was recorded - the highest in the world. Roughly three and a half of those hours were on social media. But greater access to information has not translated into stronger verification practices. The World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2026 ranks misinformation and disinformation among the top risks facing societies. Speaking at the Disinformation Dialogue 2026, IEC Chairperson Mosotho Moepya warned that the 2026 elections would likely see a shift from national misinformation and disinformation to 'ward-specific deceptions' driven by generative artificial intelligence (AI) and hyper-local campaigning. Moepya's concerns align with Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research showing that disinformation and political messaging are becoming increasingly localised and targeted at specific communities and voter groups. Community WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages have become central arenas for political discussion at the ward and municipal levels. In these spaces, information travels quickly, and verification is often limited. At the same time, political parties are investing more in digital campaigning. ISS research shows that online political advertising and influencer-driven campaigning are becoming increasingly important features of election strategies. While these tools can enhance political engagement, they can also make it harder for voters to distinguish between authentic political discussion, sponsored content and coordinated influence campaigns. AI is further complicating the picture. South Africa has not yet experienced a major election crisis linked to deepfakes, but AI-generated content is becoming cheaper, more accessible and harder to detect. As a result, information integrity will no longer be simply a media issue, but an integral part of citizenship, democracy and governance. Technology is not inherently the problem. It can be used both to spread harmful falsehoods and to help voters access accurate information. South Africa's challenge is to ensure that the tools designed to strengthen democratic participation evolve as quickly as the technologies used to manipulate it. Much of the public conversation around disinformation focuses on social media users. However, verification cannot be the sole responsibility of citizens. Professional and legacy media journalists remain one of democracy's most important lines of defence against false and misleading information. They investigate claims, provide context and test competing narratives before they reach the p