South Africa FMD: State Response Failure Devastates Dairy Farmer

• Dairy farmer Richard de Bufanos experienced a devastating Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak across his six farms in South Africa starting May 2025.
• The Department of Agriculture initially failed to quarantine an infected neighboring herd and refused to vaccinate de Bufanos's animals or allow him to purchase private vaccines.
• Despite de Bufanos's biosecurity measures, FMD, which spreads easily via multiple vectors, infected all his cattle after a delayed and ineffective state response.
• John Steenhuisen, then agriculture minister, was identified as blocking farmers from buying their own FMD vaccines, contributing to the crisis.
• The FMD epidemic highlights a long-standing breakdown of South Africa's zone-based disease control system and raises questions about potential legal action against the state for negligence.

The state's failure to quarantine infected herds, its initial refusal to vaccinate, and critically, its prohibition on private FMD vaccination in South Africa, could form the basis for legal challenges by affected farmers seeking redress for economic losses.

Richard de Bufanos, a dairy farmer operating near Zonkizizwe township, south-east of Johannesburg, faced a devastating outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in May 2025. He was alerted by a state veterinarian that FMD had been identified in cattle belonging to an informal farmer situated directly across from his property. Despite regulatory requirements, the neighboring herd was not quarantined, reportedly due to the state's inability to provide feed for the animals. Furthermore, the Department of Agriculture initially declined to vaccinate de Bufanos's own livestock, indicating either an unwillingness or lack of capacity.

In an attempt to safeguard his herd, de Bufanos implemented stringent biosecurity measures, including prohibiting the entry of any new cattle onto his farm and maintaining an existing two-meter trench around its perimeter. However, the highly contagious nature of FMD makes containment extremely challenging once a nearby herd is infected. The virus can spread through various vectors, including small animals like mongooses carrying infected dung, farm workers or visitors with peripheral contact, vehicle tires, and even potentially via fog or birds over significant distances. The disease has an incubation period of two to fourteen days in cloven-hoofed animals before symptoms manifest.

It was therefore not unexpected when, on May 26, the first cow on de Bufanos's farm began exhibiting FMD symptoms. Within four days, 180 animals were infected. Although the state finally vaccinated his herd on May 30, the intervention was largely ineffective by that point. De Bufanos, who owns or partners in a total of six farms across Gauteng and the Free State, sought to protect his other operations. His requests for vaccination of these additional herds were denied, as was his plea to purchase and administer vaccines himself. This refusal to allow FMD private vaccination in South Africa proved critical. On June 3, animals on his second farm contracted the disease, followed by his third farm on June 6. The department eventually vaccinated the second farm's animals on June 9, but the pattern continued until FMD had spread to all six of his properties.

The unfolding South Africa cattle epidemic highlights a profound failure in the state's response to foot and mouth disease. De Bufanos expressed his exasperation, stating that authorities “couldn’t help and they prevented us from helping ourselves.” This sentiment underscores a critical policy decision that exacerbated the crisis: the prohibition on farmers acquiring their own FMD vaccines. Notably, John Steenhuisen, then head of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the minister responsible for agriculture, was identified as the individual who blocked farmers from purchasing their own vaccines, a stance that drew widespread disappointment from affected agriculturalists.

This specific John Steenhuisen FMD vaccine ban is symptomatic of a broader, long-standing breakdown in the country's FMD control mechanisms. The established system, designed to prevent such outbreaks, relies on a zone-based approach, including an inspection area bordering a "free zone." Within this inspection area, the state is mandated to rigorously monitor cattle movement and actively search for potential infections. However, this entire zone-based system has been reported as "completely broken down." The signs that the system to control FMD had broken started to show in January 2019, and FMD is still spreading across the country as of September 2026.

A key element of the FMD challenge in South Africa involves the Kruger National Park, where buffaloes act as carriers of the disease but rarely suffer severe illness themselves. Informal cattle farmers operating around the park are susceptible to FMD transmission from these buffaloes. To mitigate this, a protection zone was established in the region bordering Kruger, where informal farmers were supposed to bring their herds weekly to state-managed dip tanks for de-ticking and disease inspection. The failure of these foundational systems, compounded by the Department of Agriculture FMD ZA's restrictive policies, created fertile ground for the widespread South Africa FMD state response failure.

The devastating impact on Richard de Bufanos's operations, where FMD ultimately infected cattle on all six of his farms, illustrates the severe consequences of the state's inability to manage the crisis and its active prevention of private intervention. This situation raises significant questions regarding potential dereliction of duty by the Department of Agriculture and the broader implications for agricultural law in South Africa concerning FMD. The state's failure to quarantine infected herds, its initial refusal to vaccinate, and critically, its prohibition on private FMD vaccination in South Africa, could form the basis for legal challenges by affected farmers seeking redress for economic losses.

The narrative points to a systemic issue that predates the immediate crisis, with the FMD control systems having deteriorated over many years under previous administrations. The current situation, however, highlights an urgent need for regulatory reform, particularly concerning the involvement of the private sector in disease control. The experience of farmers like de Bufanos, who were "prevented from helping ourselves," underscores the necessity for a re-evaluation of policies that restrict access to vital tools like vaccines. Compliance officers in the agricultural sector should closely monitor any forthcoming changes in policy regarding FMD control and private sector involvement, as these reforms could significantly alter liabilities and operational procedures for farmers and related businesses. The ongoing South Africa FMD state response failure demands a comprehensive overhaul to prevent future cattle epidemics and protect the nation's agricultural economy.

This article highlights potential grounds for farmers to pursue legal action against the South African Department of Agriculture for negligence or dereliction of duty in managing the FMD crisis and preventing private intervention. It also signals an urgent need for regulatory reform regarding FMD control and private sector involvement, which compliance officers in the agricultural sector should monitor closely for changes in policy and potential liabilities.

Source: Reporting based on recent agricultural sector analysis.