
KENYA'S COMPETITION LAW AMMENDMENTS FACE OPPOSITION BY LAW FIRMS OVER OVERREACH FOR KENYAN BUSINESSES
Abstract
Anjarwalla & Khanna and Bowmans have formally objected to provisions in the Competition (Amendment) Bill and the Microfinance Bill now before Kenya's Parliament, arguing that both instruments expand the powers of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) without corresponding safeguards for regulated entities
The firms flagged warrantless entry powers for CBK, compressed licence-cancellation timelines, personal liability protections for regulators that could shield gross negligence, and vague competition offences that risk criminalising ordinary commercial conduct
The Kenya Bankers Association separately objected to a proposed fourfold increase in microfinance minimum core capital, from Sh60 million to Sh250 million, warning it could push smaller local players out of the sector.
Introduction
Two of Kenya's most established corporate law firms have taken the unusual step of appearing before a parliamentary committee to argue, in effect, that the government is drafting itself too much power.
Anjarwalla & Khanna and Bowmans made submissions to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning on the Competition (Amendment) Bill and the Microfinance Bill, and their objections were specific rather than general.
Background
The Competition Act, 2010 already gives the Competition Authority of Kenya powers to investigate and penalise abuse of dominance, restrictive trade practices and abuse of superior bargaining position. The Act was amended in 2019 to introduce the superior bargaining position provisions specifically to protect smaller suppliers and buyers from exploitation by larger counterparties. The Competition (Amendment) Bill now before Parliament proposes to layer additional offences onto this framework, including provisions on abuse of buyer power that Bowmans argues substantially duplicate existing law.
Karanja from Anjarwalla & Khanna wants a High Court warrant requirement before CBK can inspect the premises of unlicensed entities suspected of illegal deposit-taking.
Karimi and Mutegi from Bowmans want the abuse of buyer power provisions stripped out of the Competition Bill because they overlap with existing abuse of superior bargaining position rules, and they want criminal liability for executives replaced with administrative penalties.
Analysis
For legal counsel, compliance teams and boards across banking, microfinance and any business with a dominant market position, these Bills represent a live opportunity to shape enforcement architecture before it is locked into statute.
This matters because both Bills are close to their final legislative stage. Submissions to a finance committee are the last realistic point at which industry can shape the text before it becomes binding law. Once enacted, warrantless entry powers, 28-day licence cancellation windows and expanded competition offences will apply to every regulated institution and, in the competition case, to any business with market power regardless of sector.
Boards of licensed financial institutions and any company with meaningful market share need to treat this legislative window as a governance matter, not purely a legal or public affairs one. If the Bills pass with expanded CBK entry powers and broader competition offences, boards will need to satisfy themselves that management has reassessed enforcement risk exposure and updated escalation protocols for regulatory visits and investigations. Audit and risk committees should specifically ask whether existing incident response plans assume a warrant requirement that may no longer exist in practice.
Conclusion
Kenya's Parliament is close to finalising two Bills that will materially expand CBK and CAK enforcement powers. Neither law firm objects to stronger regulation in principle. Their concern, and KBA's, is that the current drafting gives regulators broad discretion without the judicial oversight, proportionate timelines and calibrated liability standards that make such powers workable in practice. The specific amendments on the table, a High Court warrant requirement, a longer licence defence period, narrower liability protection for regulators, removal of overlapping competition offences, and a phased capital increase, are concrete and technically grounded rather than general objections. Whether Parliament adopts them will determine the practical risk profile facing Kenya's financial and broader commercial sector for years to come. Institutions with a stake in the outcome have a narrow but real opportunity to influence that outcome before the Bills are enacted.
Citations
- 1.Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2026 (Kenya), as submitted to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning.
- 2.Microfinance Bill (Kenya), as submitted to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning.
- 3.Competition Act, No. 12 of 2010 (Kenya), as amended.
- 4.Microfinance Act, No. 19 of 2006 (Kenya).
- 5.Central Bank of Kenya Act, Cap. 491, Laws of Kenya.
- 6.Banking Act, Cap. 488, Laws of Kenya.
- 7.Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 31 (Right to Privacy).
- 8.Submissions of Anjarwalla & Khanna to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning, 2026.
- 9.Submissions of Bowmans (Coulson Harney LLP) to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning, 2026.
- 10.Submissions of the Kenya Bankers Association to the Parliamentary Committee on Finance and National Planning, 2026.
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