US Constitutional Law: "Born Free & Equal" vs. No Constitutional Right to Privacy Argument

• The "born free and equal" concept is deeply rooted in American history, appearing in the Declaration of Independence and six early state constitutions.
• This idea is reflected in key historical documents and speeches, including Corfield v. Coryell, the Seneca Falls Declaration, and the Gettysburg Address.
• The author argues the "born free and equal" principle permeates the Constitution, meeting the "deeply rooted in American history and tradition" standard.
• This standard, used in cases like Washington v. Glucksberg to reject a right to assisted suicide, is presented as a crucial test for unenumerated rights.
• The analysis implicitly contrasts the historical depth of the "born free and equal" idea with the perceived lack thereof for a constitutional right to privacy.

By emphasizing the deeply ingrained historical and traditional presence of the "born free and equal" idea, the author implicitly challenges the foundation of a no constitutional right to privacy argument by suggesting it lacks the same profound historical grounding.

A recent analysis, the second in a series of five articles, delves into the profound significance of the "born free and equal" clauses within U.S. constitutional law. These foundational principles were not only enshrined in the Declaration of Independence but also featured prominently in six of the twelve state constitutions at the time the federal Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. This widespread adoption underscores their early and deep integration into American legal thought.

For instance, Article I of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 explicitly states: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness." This articulation highlights the comprehensive nature of these rights, encompassing personal liberty, property, and the pursuit of well-being.

The enduring influence of the "born free and equal" concept extends far beyond these early documents. It is reflected in pivotal moments throughout American history, including Justice Bushrod Washington’s seminal 1823 opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, which addressed fundamental rights. Its spirit also animated the 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, which adapted the language of the Declaration of Independence to advocate for sex equality. Further echoes are found in President Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s "I Have a Dream" speech, demonstrating its consistent resonance across centuries.

The author of this analysis posits a distinct argument regarding the pervasive nature of the "born free and equal" idea within the framework of `constitutional law`. Unlike concepts such as a `right to privacy`, the author contends that the principle of being born free and equal so thoroughly permeates the Constitution that it satisfies the stringent legal standard of being "deeply rooted in American history and tradition." This standard is crucial in `unenumerated rights US Constitution` jurisprudence, often determining whether a right, not explicitly listed, can be considered constitutionally protected.

This interpretive approach draws heavily on the `Washington v. Glucksberg analysis`, a landmark case where the Supreme Court rejected a claimed right to assisted suicide by applying the "deeply rooted" test. The author views `Washington v. Glucksberg` as a correctly decided case, aligning its methodology with the proper assessment of unenumerated rights. Similarly, `McDonald v. City of Chicago`, another landmark decision, is cited as correctly applying this same historical and traditional rootedness standard.

By emphasizing the deeply ingrained historical and traditional presence of the "born free and equal" idea, the author implicitly challenges the foundation of a `no constitutional right to privacy argument` by suggesting it lacks the same profound historical grounding. This perspective frames the "born free and equal" principle as a more fundamental and historically validated constitutional tenet compared to other asserted rights.

The analytical framework presented carries significant implications for how `unenumerated rights US Constitution` are understood and litigated. By asserting that the "born free and equal" idea is demonstrably "deeply rooted in American history and tradition," the author provides a robust historical and philosophical basis for certain constitutional claims, while simultaneously offering a lens through which to scrutinize others.

This perspective suggests that for an unenumerated right to be recognized, it must demonstrate a historical lineage and traditional acceptance comparable to the "born free and equal" principle. The author's ongoing series of articles aims to further elaborate on this interpretive approach, offering a consistent methodology for evaluating the constitutional validity of various rights claims. This approach could influence future `constitutional law` debates, particularly those concerning rights not explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights.

Lawyers involved in constitutional litigation, especially concerning privacy or other unenumerated rights, should consider this interpretive approach. It provides a framework for anticipating potential judicial reasoning or for formulating arguments that either challenge or defend the scope of such rights, by focusing on their historical and traditional embeddedness in American legal and political thought.

This article presents a specific analytical framework arguing against a constitutional 'right to privacy' based on the 'born free and equal' clauses. Lawyers involved in constitutional litigation, particularly concerning privacy or unenumerated rights, should consider this interpretive approach to anticipate potential judicial reasoning or to formulate arguments challenging or defending the scope of such rights.

Source: Original reporting via constitutional law analysis