Allahabad HC: Divorced Woman Maintenance Despite Desertion Under CrPC 125

• The Allahabad High Court ruled that a divorced woman can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now 144 BNSS) even if her husband obtained the divorce on grounds of her desertion.
• The court set aside a family court order that had rejected Suneeta's maintenance claim, remitting the matter for fresh consideration.
• This decision relied on the Supreme Court's `Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (2000)` ruling, which established that a divorced woman remains a 'wife' for maintenance purposes if unable to support herself and not remarried.
• The High Court found no evidence that Suneeta had an independent income sufficient for her maintenance.
• Suneeta is entitled to maintenance from the date of divorce (September 25, 2014) until remarriage, with previous Army-paid amounts to be accounted for.

The Allahabad High Court recently affirmed that a divorced woman retains the right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), now codified as Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), even if her former husband secured the divorce on grounds of her alleged desertion.

The Allahabad High Court recently affirmed that a divorced woman retains the right to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), now codified as Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), even if her former husband secured the divorce on grounds of her alleged desertion. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) came into force on July 1, 2024, replacing the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 125 CrPC has been replaced by Section 144 of the BNSS, with largely unchanged wording, meaning existing case law continues to apply. This significant ruling by Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra overturned a family court's decision that had dismissed a maintenance plea from Suneeta, remanding the case for a fresh review. Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra is a Permanent Judge of the Allahabad High Court, having taken oath on September 25, 2023, and is scheduled to retire on November 5, 2026. During the ongoing proceedings, the court had already mandated her former husband, Rajesh Kumar Yadav, to provide Rs 4,000 monthly as interim maintenance.

Suneeta had initially sought maintenance for herself and her son, alleging harassment over dowry and claiming her husband had brought another woman into their home, introducing her as his wife. Rajesh, an Army personnel, refuted these accusations, asserting that Suneeta had deserted him and was unwilling to cohabit. He also stated his readiness to support her but cited the unavailability of family accommodation at his Army posting as a reason for not keeping her with him. The family court, while acknowledging Suneeta as Rajesh's legally wedded wife, ultimately rejected her maintenance application, partly influenced by deductions from Rajesh's Army salary purportedly for maintenance.

However, the High Court scrutinized the Army records concerning these deductions, finding conflicting information. One communication from the Army indicated the amount was specifically for the son's maintenance, not Suneeta. This discrepancy highlighted a critical flaw in the family court's reasoning, paving the way for the High Court to re-evaluate the maintenance claim, particularly in light of the husband's subsequent divorce decree.

A pivotal development in the case was Rajesh's acquisition of an ex-parte divorce decree against Suneeta on September 25, 2014, citing desertion. Evidence presented to the High Court also revealed that Rajesh subsequently remarried, with Neelam Yadav's name appearing as his wife in his service records. This sequence of events brought into focus the critical question of whether a divorce granted on the ground of desertion automatically extinguishes a divorced wife's maintenance desertion ground claim under CrPC 125.

The Allahabad High Court maintenance ruling drew heavily upon the Supreme Court's landmark judgment in `Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (2000)`. This precedent clarified that for the specific purpose of claiming maintenance, a woman divorced by her husband continues to fall within the definition of a 'wife' under Section 125 CrPC. The Supreme Court had unequivocally held that if a divorced woman is unable to sustain herself and has not remarried, she is entitled to maintenance, irrespective of whether the divorce was obtained by the husband on the ground of her desertion. This principle is fundamental to India family law maintenance rights, ensuring that the marital status does not solely dictate financial support post-divorce.

Applying this established legal principle, the High Court concluded that a divorced woman is indeed entitled to maintenance until she either remarries or becomes capable of supporting herself through her own earnings, subject to other applicable legal conditions. This interpretation reinforces the protective nature of Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS divorced woman maintenance), ensuring that a technical ground for divorce does not leave a former spouse destitute.

The High Court determined that the family court's outright rejection of Suneeta's maintenance claim was flawed, citing both legal and factual errors. Crucially, there was no evidence presented to establish that Suneeta possessed an independent income sufficient for her self-maintenance. This absence of proof was a significant factor in the High Court's decision to set aside the lower court's order.

Consequently, the Allahabad High Court directed that Suneeta is entitled to seek maintenance from her former husband from the date of their divorce, September 25, 2014, and this entitlement will continue throughout her lifetime unless she remarries. Her son was also deemed entitled to maintenance from the date the original petition was filed. The court further stipulated that any maintenance amounts previously paid through Army authorities must be duly accounted for when calculating arrears, ensuring a fair and equitable settlement.

This ruling underscores that a divorce decree obtained by the husband on grounds of the wife's desertion does not, by itself, defeat a maintenance claim under CrPC 125 maintenance desertion divorce. It serves as a vital precedent for future cases involving divorced women seeking financial support, particularly when the husband has secured a divorce on desertion grounds, reinforcing the judiciary's commitment to ensuring the financial well-being of vulnerable spouses.

Lawyers advising clients on divorce and maintenance matters in India must note that a divorce decree obtained by the husband on grounds of the wife's desertion does not automatically bar her maintenance claim under Section 125 CrPC (now 144 BNSS). This ruling reinforces the need to assess the divorced woman's ability to maintain herself and her marital status, providing a strong precedent for advocating for or defending against such claims.

Source: Original reporting via Live Law