Sloganeering against government not sedition: P&H High Court upholds acquittal in Dera Sacha Sauda violence case

The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently affirmed that mere sloganeering against the government, even during a violent protest, does not constitute sedition under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. Upholding the acquittal of three individuals involved in the 2017 Dera Sacha Sauda violence, the Court clarified that while violent protest might amount to rioting, it does not automatically equate to exciting hatred or contempt against the government. The judgment, delivered by Justices Vinod S Bhardwaj and Sukhvinder Kaur, reiterated the critical distinction between dissent and disaffection, emphasizing that frustration or dissatisfaction with governance is not synonymous with seditious intent. This ruling reinforces the narrow interpretation of sedition, aligning with established Supreme Court precedents that require incitement to violence or public disorder for the charge to stand.

In a significant pronouncement affirming the boundaries of free speech and dissent within a democratic framework, the Punjab and Haryana High Court recently held that sloganeering against the government, even amidst a violent protest, does not automatically warrant charges of sedition. This ruling, delivered on July 2, 2024, by a Bench of Justice Vinod S Bhardwaj and Justice Sukhvinder Kaur in the case of *State of Haryana v. Balwinder Singh and Others*, upheld the acquittal of three accused individuals linked to the widespread violence that erupted in Haryana in August 2017, following the conviction of Dera Sacha Sauda Chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh.

The judgment underscores a crucial legal distinction: while violent protests may constitute offences like rioting, they do not, by themselves, fulfill the stringent criteria for sedition. The Court emphasized that expressions of frustration, dissatisfaction, or outrage against the government are legitimate forms of dissent in an elected democracy and do not amount to 'disaffection' or 'hatred' as contemplated by Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. This decision provides vital clarity on the application of sedition law, particularly in the context of public demonstrations and political expression, reinforcing the constitutional safeguards for freedom of speech.

The law of sedition in India is enshrined in Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a colonial-era provision introduced in 1870. It penalizes anyone who, by words, signs, or visible representation, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India. The term 'disaffection' is broadly defined to include disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. However, the section also includes explanations clarifying that comments expressing disapprobation of government measures or administrative actions, made with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting hatred, contempt, or disaffection, do not constitute an offence.

The constitutional validity and interpretation of Section 124A have been subjects of extensive judicial scrutiny. The landmark Supreme Court judgment in *Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar*, AIR 1962 SC 955, significantly narrowed the scope of sedition. The Supreme Court held that for an act to be considered seditious, it must involve an 'incitement to violence' or have the 'tendency to create public disorder'. Mere criticism of the government, however strong, without such an element of incitement, does not fall within the ambit of sedition. This interpretation has been a cornerstone in protecting freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).

The immediate context for the present case was the widespread violence that erupted across Haryana and Punjab in August 2017, following the conviction of Dera Sacha Sauda chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh in a rape case. Thousands of his followers gathered, leading to clashes with authorities, arson, and destruction of public property, resulting in numerous casualties. In the aftermath, several individuals were booked under various charges, including sedition, for their alleged involvement in the unrest and for raising slogans against the government.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court's recent decision in *State of Haryana v. Balwinder Singh and Others* meticulously applied the established legal principles governing sedition, particularly those laid down in *Kedar Nath Singh*. The core of the prosecution's case against the acquitted individuals rested on allegations that they had raised slogans in support of Dera Sacha Sauda and against the government during the 2017 violence. The trial court had acquitted them in 2019, a decision challenged by the State government in 2021.

The High Court, comprising Justices Vinod S Bhardwaj and Sukhvinder Kaur, critically examined the evidence presented. It concluded that the evidence merely suggested 'slogan against Government, which is only a means of expressing dissent and not hatred/contempt or dis-affection.' This observation is pivotal, as it reiterates that critical expression, even if vociferous or 'outrage[ous]', does not automatically cross the threshold into sedition. The Court explicitly stated that 'a sloganeering against the Government or wings of governance, in an elected democracy, would not be sufficient to slap charges of sedition against its citizens.' This aligns perfectly with the *Kedar Nath Singh* dictum, which mandates that seditious acts must have an intention or tendency to incite violence or public disorder.

Furthermore, the High Court distinguished between violent protest and sedition. It noted that 'a violent protest may amount to rioting but such action of violence cannot be perceived as an act of bringing in hatred or contempt against the government.' This distinction is crucial for practitioners, as it clarifies that while acts of violence or damage to property during a protest can lead to charges under relevant penal provisions (e.g., rioting, mischief), they do not inherently trigger Section 124A unless there is a clear intent to incite disaffection against the government leading to public disorder. The Court found substantial contradictions, material omissions, and doubtful recoveries in the prosecution's case, further weakening the sedition charge.

This judgment reinforces the judiciary's role as a bulwark against the overreach of sedition laws, particularly in contexts where public discontent is expressed. It serves as a reminder that the right to criticize the government is a fundamental aspect of a healthy democracy and that Section 124A cannot be used to stifle legitimate dissent. The ruling also implicitly acknowledges the Supreme Court's current stance on Section 124A, which has been temporarily put on hold for re-examination, indicating a broader judicial trend towards a more restrictive application of the provision.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision in *State of Haryana v. Balwinder Singh and Others* is a timely and significant reaffirmation of the narrow interpretation of sedition law in India. For legal practitioners, this judgment provides crucial guidance: mere sloganeering or expressions of frustration against the government, even in the context of violent protests, are insufficient to sustain a charge of sedition. The emphasis remains firmly on the requirement of incitement to violence or public disorder, a high bar established by the Supreme Court in *Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar*.

Practitioners should meticulously scrutinize the evidence in sedition cases, focusing on whether there is a direct link between the alleged seditious act and an actual or intended incitement to violence or public disorder. The ruling highlights that other offences, such as rioting or damage to property, should be charged where applicable, without automatically resorting to the draconian provisions of Section 124A. As the Supreme Court continues its re-examination of Section 124A, this High Court judgment signals a consistent judicial approach towards safeguarding freedom of speech and expression, reminding the State that dissent, however inconvenient, is not sedition.