Bashir Usman: Lone lawmaker who voted against State Police bill in House of Reps

The Nigerian House of Representatives recently passed a constitutional amendment bill to establish state police, a significant step towards decentralizing the nation's security architecture. While the bill garnered overwhelming support, with 289 out of 290 lawmakers voting in favour, one legislator, Bashir Usman from Kaduna State, cast the sole dissenting vote. Usman's objection was rooted in a procedural error, specifically the late circulation of the constitutional review report, which he argued denied members adequate time for proper scrutiny before the vote. This article examines the legal implications of this procedural challenge within the context of Nigeria's legislative framework and its potential bearing on the legitimacy and future legal challenges to the proposed constitutional alteration.

The recent passage of the State Police bill by the Nigerian House of Representatives marks a pivotal moment in the ongoing national discourse on security sector reform and federalism. The proposed legislation, which seeks to amend the 1999 Constitution to allow states to establish their own police forces, received near-unanimous endorsement, reflecting a broad consensus on the need to address Nigeria's escalating insecurity.

Amidst this overwhelming support, a singular voice of dissent emerged from Hon. Bashir Usman, representing Birnin-Gwari/Giwa Federal Constituency of Kaduna State. Usman's 'nay' vote, the only one among 290 members, was not a rejection of the substantive merits of state policing but a principled stand against what he termed a 'procedural error.' He contended that the constitutional review report, containing the proposed amendments, was circulated too late, thereby precluding lawmakers from undertaking a thorough review before the vote.

This article delves into the legal ramifications of Hon. Usman's procedural objection, exploring the interplay between legislative rules, constitutional amendment processes, and the potential for judicial review. It will analyze the basis of his challenge, the Speaker's response, and the broader implications for the legitimacy of legislation passed under alleged procedural irregularities in Nigeria.

Nigeria's policing system has historically been centralized, with Section 214(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) establishing the Nigeria Police Force as the sole police force for the entire federation. This constitutional provision places policing on the Exclusive Legislative List, granting the Federal Government exclusive control over law enforcement. However, persistent and worsening security challenges, including terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, and communal violence, have fueled widespread calls for a decentralized policing system.

The proposed State Police bill aims to alter this fundamental structure by moving policing from the Exclusive Legislative List to the Concurrent Legislative List, thereby empowering state governments to establish, fund, and operate their own police forces alongside the federal police. The process for amending the Nigerian Constitution is rigorous, as stipulated in Section 9 of the 1999 Constitution. It requires the support of a two-thirds majority of members in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, followed by the approval of at least two-thirds of the 36 State Houses of Assembly, before receiving presidential assent.

Furthermore, the legislative process in Nigeria is governed by the 1999 Constitution itself and the Standing Rules of each legislative chamber. Section 60 of the Constitution grants the Senate and the House of Representatives the power to regulate their own procedures. These Standing Rules are not mere formalities; legal scholarship and judicial pronouncements emphasize that failure to adhere to mandatory constitutional provisions or legislative rules can render an enacted law unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void.

Hon. Bashir Usman's objection to the State Police bill was predicated on a perceived breach of legislative procedure. He argued that the report of the House Committee on Constitution Review, which contained the proposed amendments, was made available to lawmakers only shortly before the debate and vote, denying them adequate time to properly study its contents. This challenge highlights a critical aspect of legislative due process: the right of members to be fully informed before making decisions, especially on constitutional amendments of such national significance.

In response to Usman's point of order, Speaker Tajudeen Abbas ruled that lawmakers were already familiar with the issues contained in the report and insisted on proceeding with the business of the day, citing the urgent need to address the country's worsening security situation. This ruling underscores a tension often present in legislative bodies: balancing strict adherence to procedural rules with the perceived exigencies of national interest. While the Speaker's decision facilitated the swift passage of the bill, it simultaneously formalized a procedural challenge on the legislative record.

Nigerian jurisprudence has consistently affirmed the importance of procedural regularity in lawmaking. Courts have held that where a law or rule expressly provides for certain actions as a precondition, failure to adhere to such stipulations renders the act void and of no effect. For instance, in *Garba V. Nigerian Army & Ors (2019) LPELR- 4390(CA)*, the Court of Appeal reiterated that non-compliance with conditions precedent can invalidate an action. Similarly, the Supreme Court in *Nemi & ors v. State (1994) LPELR-24854 (SC)* has held that failure to initiate a suit by due process renders it incompetent. While these cases pertain to judicial processes, the underlying principle of due process extends to legislative actions, particularly constitutional amendments which require a higher degree of scrutiny and adherence to prescribed procedures.

Although Usman's lone vote did not prevent the bill's passage in the House, his formal objection could become a crucial point of contention if the bill's validity is challenged in court after it has gone through the entire amendment process and received presidential assent. A judicial review could scrutinize whether the House's proceedings met the constitutional and procedural standards for lawmaking, especially concerning the adequate opportunity for deliberation. The argument would likely center on whether the 'rushed consideration' amounted to a fundamental procedural defect, rendering the House's passage of the bill susceptible to being declared unconstitutional. This is particularly relevant given that the bill seeks to alter fundamental provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which itself is the supreme law of the land.

The overwhelming passage of the State Police bill by the House of Representatives reflects a strong political will to address Nigeria's pervasive security challenges through a decentralized policing model. This move, if fully enacted, would fundamentally reshape the country's security architecture and federal structure, aligning Nigeria more closely with other federal systems that operate multi-layered policing institutions.

However, Hon. Bashir Usman's lone dissenting vote, grounded in a procedural challenge, introduces a potential legal vulnerability to this otherwise popular legislative initiative. While the Speaker's ruling prioritized expediency, the principle that legislative acts must strictly adhere to prescribed procedures remains a cornerstone of constitutional governance in Nigeria. Practitioners in constitutional law and legislative advocacy must closely monitor the bill's journey through the Senate and the State Houses of Assembly, as well as any subsequent judicial challenges. The outcome of such challenges could set important precedents regarding the balance between legislative efficiency and the imperative of procedural due process, ultimately impacting the legitimacy and enforceability of future legislation in Nigeria.