Briefly Africa Critical Minerals Report | September 2026

Congo wants to control what is known about its underground before anyone else does, not just the minerals already coming out of it. In September, the head of the National Geological Survey announced a state-controlled geological data bank, to be fully operational by the end of 2026, with free basic data and paid access to sensitive datasets. In October, the country put eight aircraft in the air under PC2G-RDC, a 36-month programme funded by its own mining revenues to double the share of the country with modern geoscience data.

Whoever controls that data will influence where exploration money goes and which future copper, cobalt, lithium and germanium deposits get developed. Congo intends that to be Congo.

Congo has capped cobalt exports since early 2025, first with an outright ban and then with quotas, to push up prices. It worked until September. Cobalt hydroxide, Congo's main cobalt export, had more than quadrupled by April but has since slid almost 30% as exports picked up.

Benchmark Mineral put the quarter's fall at 31%, with cobalt trading at $39,140 per tonne on 29 September. Even the state's own artisanal channel is adding supply: Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC) says its exports spiked in the first half of 2026 as the government formalised the sector. Kinshasa now has to decide whether to tighten.

In August, the regulator ARECOMS said a quota cut may be considered if the supply-demand imbalance persists or worsens.

Congo is building its case to the West as a clean, traceable supplier of critical minerals. The main threat to that case comes from outside the state's control: the occupation of mineral-rich eastern Congo by the AFC/M23 rebellion, and the cross-border trade through Rwanda that turns Congolese minerals into Rwandan exports. In September 2026, Amnesty International documented that M23 killed, tortured and forced miners to dig coltan and gold at Rubaya and Lomera, trafficked the minerals to Rwanda, and likely committed the war crime of pillage.

These findings build on years of UN Group of Experts reporting that Congolese coltan is smuggled to Rwanda, mixed with Rwandan production and exported downstream. A new lithium operation has meanwhile appeared in M23-held Rubaya. The EU's minerals partnership with Rwanda remains in place despite the European Parliament's call to suspend it.

In the copper heartland, Kinshasa faces a separate enforcement test, as soldier-backed intruders returned to an ERG cobalt site. For buyers of tantalum and gold routed through Rwanda, compliance risk is rising sharply.

Congo's subcontracting regulator, ARSP, moved from warnings to orders in September. It told two Glencore-controlled mines to drop 1,540 ineligible suppliers, then issued similar injunctions to ERG, Ivanhoe's Kipushi zinc mine, Chinese-controlled Sicomines and others, reaching more than 1,800 contracts in all. Next comes permanent oversight.

A new local-content law takes effect on 1 January 2027, with sanctions and mandatory three-year compliance plans, and annual audits of major miners begin that year. 7 billion in 2025 subcontracts already went to majority Congolese-owned firms. That raises the question of whether the drive is about capacity or about who wins contracts.

One gap remains: the 31 July deadline for miners to give Congolese employees 5% of their shares passed with no major producer announcing completed transfers.

On 11 September, Congo's cabinet formally created a "DRC-USA Task Force" to speed up its strategic minerals partnership with Washington, seven months after it was meant to start. The pact can already point to results: a US-backed investment through Virtus Minerals, which bought copper-cobalt miner Chemaf; expanded copper offtake from Gécamines through Mercuria and Glencore; a US-financed Lobito railway that expects to double cargo next year after drawing about US$300 million of its US$753 million package; and US explorer KoBold using AI to hunt for lithium in Manono. But the biggest deal remains unsigned.

Glencore's proposed sale of a 40% stake in its two Congolese mines to the US-backed Orion consortium is still a non-binding agreement from February.

Congo's mining rules are tightening through three separate instruments, and the one making headlines matters least. A ban on copper and cobalt concentrate exports, signed on 29 June and revealed on 6 August, repeats a policy Congo has tried since 2013, in a country that already ships most of its copper as refined metal. The bigger change sits in the same order: a new tax on minor metals recovered during refining, built on a 55% valuation coefficient, whose three-month transition should end around now.

Behind both looms a bill to rewrite more than 40 articles of the 2018 Mining Code, expanding state control over strategic minerals and allowing state stockpiles. It provoked an emergency industry forum in July and has gone quiet since.

Ghana’s Gold Board (GoldBod) exceeded its September 2026 foreign exchange generation target by US$471 million, reporting a total of US$1.871 billion. Of this amount, US$701.3 million was allocated to commercial banks, while US$1.170 billion was directed to the Bank of Ghana for reserve accumulation.

For October, GoldBod has set a new target of US$1.5 billion, with a revised distribution framework. Under the new Spot FX Sales/Intermediation Framework, GoldBod will manage sales to participating banks directly, while the Bank of Ghana shifts its focus toward regulatory oversight. This change marks a departure from previous intermediation practices, with US$1 billion now earmarked for commercial banks and up to US$500 million for central bank reserves.

Ghana’s gold-for-reserves programme is currently under investigation following allegations of a US$1.7 billion loss associated with the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP). GoldBod has publicly defended its performance, citing surpluses in its 2025 accounts and asserting that the financial exposure of the programme rests with the central bank rather than GoldBod itself.

The dispute has gained political traction, with an opposition motion for a formal inquiry currently pending. The central legal and financial question remains the determination of liability for the alleged losses, as stakeholders seek clarity on the governance and risk-sharing arrangements between the state-run GoldBod and the central bank.

The Ghanaian government is revising its proposed 2026 mining legislation following significant pushback from industry stakeholders regarding lease terms and state regulatory powers. An initial draft had proposed the introduction of a state-held special share, which would have granted the government veto rights over major corporate decisions, alongside a reduction in the duration of mining leases.

Recent reports indicate that the revised bill is expected to restore a maximum 20-year lease term, addressing some industry concerns. These legislative adjustments occur within the context of a broader national policy shift, underscored by President John Mahama’s commitment to ending the export of raw mineral ores by 2030, a move designed to ensure that a greater portion of mineral value is retained within the domestic economy.

The Ewoyaa lithium project in Ghana is undergoing a major ownership transition, with China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt moving to acquire Atlantic Lithium for US$210 million and purchasing North American company Elevra’s interests for US$71 million. While Australian regulators have approved the takeover, the transaction remains subject to Ghanaian regulatory approval regarding the Elevra sale.

If the acquisitions are finalized, Huayou Cobalt is expected to hold an indirect interest of approximately 87% in the Ewoyaa project, with the Ghanaian state retaining a 13% free-carried interest. The proposed deal has raised questions regarding the future of local shareholding requirements and the long-term status of Atlantic Lithium’s listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange.

From 1 January 2027, Zimbabwe bans exports of lithium concentrate, the semi-processed ore that earned the country about nine-tenths of its lithium export revenue in the first half of 2026. After that date, miners must convert concentrate into lithium sulphate at home before exporting. With 86 days to go, only one sulphate plant is running, and it says it has no room for anyone else's ore.

The producers asked for more time and were refused; the government told them to toll through Huayou's Prospect Lithium and Sinomine's Bikita. But Bikita's own plant date has slipped three times and now sits at July 2027, six months after the ban begins. Smaller producers are only now ordering equipment.

Zimbabwe still governs its mines under a law from 1961. The bill meant to replace it, gazetted in June 2025, remains blocked by a constitutional objection from Parliament's Legal Committee. In June, the government was given 14 days to fix six remaining problems; by the end of September there was no public sign the bill had moved.

Meanwhile, the Mines Ministry has pressed ahead with the bill's main ideas by announcement: it reserved small-scale gold mining for citizens, declared lithium and gold strategic, and set hard deadlines for titles. The chair of Parliament's mines committee put it bluntly: the minister is acting as if the bill were already law. In the lithium belt, communities say new projects linked to powerful political figures are moving faster than the protections meant to govern them.

Zimbabwe’s state-led mineral procurement channels are reporting record performance, with the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) doubling sales to US$4.74 billion in the nine months to September. Simultaneously, the Fidelity Gold Refinery reported purchasing 31.17 tonnes of gold in the eight months to August, with small-scale and artisanal miners accounting for nearly 72% of these deliveries.

Despite these volumes, the state’s market position remains precarious due to pricing pressures. Fidelity currently offers prices approximately 5–6% below global market rates, creating an incentive for miners to seek alternative, often illicit, channels. The state’s attempt to mandate that small-scale miners receive 10% of their payments in local currency was quickly abandoned after delivery volumes declined, highlighting the sensitivity of the supply chain to regulatory interference.

Zimbabwe is seeing a diversification of its mining investor base, moving beyond the long-standing dominance of Chinese capital, which has historically accounted for approximately US$2 billion in lithium investment. Recent developments include India’s LOHUM commencing lithium operations in Matabeleland South and a new cooperation pact between Zimbabwe’s investment agency and Invest Hong Kong to attract further Asian capital.

Additionally, the signing of a 25-year special mining lease by Tharisa’s Karo Platinum marks a significant milestone, granting the state a 15% free-carried interest. These new entrants are now navigating a complex regulatory landscape characterized by strict beneficiation requirements, including a ban on lithium concentrate exports and evolving state participation mandates, which will test the resilience of these international partnerships.

London-listed Premier African Minerals has successfully raised approximately £1.2 million through a subscription of 27.52 billion new ordinary shares. This capital injection is designated as working capital to support the restart of the Zulu lithium and tantalum project, specifically facilitating the remobilization of mining activities and the recommencement of the processing plant.

Under the direction of MD Graham Hill, the company has pivoted its operational strategy. Rather than continuing the original plan of accumulating a large run-of-mine stockpile prior to processing, the firm will now move directly to processing the material. This shift is intended to expedite the project's transition into an active production phase.

Despite a robust mining boom and record export earnings across the gold, lithium, and platinum sectors, the Zimbabwean government is facing a significant fiscal challenge regarding royalty collection. Current data indicates that mining royalties are yielding only 3%, a figure that critics argue fails to capture a proportional share of the sector's substantial economic growth for the state treasury.

This discrepancy between the thriving natural resource sector and public revenue generation carries profound legal and economic implications. The situation has prompted increased scrutiny from stakeholders, as the government seeks to ensure that the country’s mineral wealth translates into meaningful public investment and fiscal stability.