Social media intermediaries can't monitor, remove videos of court hearings: Meta and Google to Delhi High Court

Tech giants Google and Meta have strongly opposed a plea before the Delhi High Court seeking to impose proactive monitoring and removal obligations on social media intermediaries for unauthorised recordings of court proceedings. The companies argue that such a directive is legally untenable, practically impossible to implement given the scale of user-generated content, and directly contravenes Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and established Supreme Court precedents, particularly *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*. They contend that their liability is limited to acting upon specific URLs identified by a court order or government notification, rather than independently adjudicating the legality of millions of videos or preventing re-uploads. This stance highlights the ongoing tension between content regulation, intermediary safe harbour provisions, and the judiciary's efforts to control the dissemination of court proceedings.

The digital landscape in India is once again at the forefront of a critical legal debate concerning intermediary liability and content moderation. In a significant development before the Delhi High Court, technology behemoths Google and Meta have firmly resisted demands to proactively monitor and remove unauthorised recordings of court proceedings from their platforms. This challenge arises from a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vaibhav Singh, which sought directions to prevent the upload, re-upload, and dissemination of such recordings, specifically those related to a hearing involving former Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal.

This case underscores a fundamental tension between the judiciary's need to maintain the sanctity and control over its proceedings, especially in the context of evolving live-streaming rules, and the statutory 'safe harbour' protections afforded to online intermediaries under Indian law. The tech giants' arguments, rooted in Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) and landmark Supreme Court judgments, assert that imposing a proactive monitoring obligation would be an impractical and legally unsound overreach. This article will delve into the legal framework governing intermediary liability in India, analyse the arguments presented by Google and Meta, and explore the broader implications for content moderation and judicial transparency.

The legal framework governing intermediary liability in India is primarily enshrined in Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. This provision grants a 'safe harbour' to intermediaries, shielding them from liability for third-party content hosted or transmitted on their platforms, provided they meet certain conditions. Key among these conditions is the requirement to observe due diligence and to act expeditiously upon receiving 'actual knowledge' of unlawful content.

The interpretation of 'actual knowledge' was definitively shaped by the Supreme Court's landmark judgment in *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*, AIR 2015 SC 1523. In this pivotal ruling, the Supreme Court read down Section 79, clarifying that an intermediary's obligation to remove content arises only upon receiving a court order or a notification from an appropriate government agency, not merely upon private complaints. This judgment explicitly rejected the notion of requiring intermediaries to proactively monitor content, citing concerns about chilling free speech and the practical impossibility of such a task.

In parallel, the Indian judiciary has been progressively embracing live-streaming of court proceedings to enhance transparency and access to justice, a right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India has circulated Model Rules for Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings, and various High Courts, including the Delhi High Court, have adopted their own specific rules. The 'Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings Rules of the High Court of Delhi, 2022' expressly prohibit any person or entity, including social media platforms, from recording, sharing, or disseminating live-streamed proceedings or archival data without authorisation. The Delhi High Court also asserts exclusive copyright over such recordings, with unauthorised usage punishable under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the law of contempt.

The core of the argument presented by Google (operating YouTube) and Meta (operating Facebook and Instagram) before the Delhi High Court rests on the principles established by Section 79 of the IT Act and the *Shreya Singhal* judgment. Both companies contend that they are merely intermediaries and, as such, cannot be burdened with the responsibility of proactively monitoring the vast amount of user-generated content uploaded daily. Google explicitly stated that it cannot "sift through the millions of videos on its platform and/ or monitor its platform to determine if there are other videos which pertain to unauthorised recordings of court proceedings and are in violation of applicable law," especially given the varying court rules across India.

Meta similarly argued that imposing a proactive monitoring obligation would violate Section 79 of the IT Act and Supreme Court precedents. Their position aligns with the 'notice and takedown' regime, where intermediaries are only required to remove content that has been "specifically identified by their URLs, once the specific videos have been adjudicated to be violative of the applicable law" by a court. This interpretation of 'actual knowledge' from *Shreya Singhal* is central to their defence, asserting that they cannot be compelled to independently determine the illegality of content without a formal directive.

The petitioner's plea, seeking directions for proactive measures to prevent re-uploads and dissemination, directly challenges this established 'safe harbour' principle. While the Delhi High Court Rules clearly prohibit unauthorised recording and sharing of proceedings, placing the onus on intermediaries to enforce this proactively presents significant legal and practical hurdles. The sheer volume of content, the difficulty in distinguishing authorised from unauthorised recordings, and the potential for over-censorship or 'chilling effect' on legitimate speech are all valid concerns raised by the tech companies.

This case highlights the ongoing struggle to balance the protection of judicial integrity and control over court proceedings with the fundamental principles of intermediary liability and freedom of expression in the digital age. While courts have the power to direct removal of specific unlawful content, extending this to a general proactive monitoring duty for intermediaries would necessitate a re-evaluation of the existing legal framework and could have far-reaching implications for online platforms in India.

The Delhi High Court's impending decision in *Vaibhav Singh v. Delhi High Court seeking, Meta platforms, Google LLC and X Corp.* will be a crucial pronouncement on the scope of intermediary liability in India, particularly concerning content moderation related to judicial proceedings. For legal practitioners, the outcome will clarify the extent to which social media platforms can be compelled to police user-generated content beyond the established 'notice and takedown' framework. Should the court lean towards imposing proactive monitoring, it could significantly alter the operational landscape for all online intermediaries, potentially leading to increased compliance costs, technological challenges, and a re-evaluation of content moderation policies.

Practitioners should closely monitor this case for its implications on the interpretation of Section 79 of the IT Act and the *Shreya Singhal* precedent. The judgment will also provide further guidance on the interplay between court-specific live-streaming and recording rules and the broader principles of digital content governance. A decision favouring proactive monitoring could trigger a wave of similar demands across various content categories, while upholding the intermediaries' arguments would reinforce the current 'safe harbour' regime, placing the primary burden of identifying and reporting unlawful content on affected parties and judicial authorities.