Have Your Say On Draft Electoral Code of Conduct On Countering Disinformation

The Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa has published a draft Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation, inviting public comments until July 21, 2026. This initiative is a critical response to the escalating threat of digital disinformation, particularly with the advent of artificial intelligence, ahead of the 2026 Local Government Elections. The proposed code aims to establish clear principles and standards for all electoral participants, promoting ethical communication, transparency, and accountability. It seeks to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes by providing practical measures to prevent, detect, and respond to the intentional spread of false or misleading information online, while carefully balancing these objectives with constitutional rights to freedom of expression and political participation.

South Africa's democratic landscape is poised for a significant evolution in its electoral oversight, as the Electoral Commission (IEC) has unveiled a draft Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation. This crucial document, published in the Government Gazette on June 30, 2026, is now open for public comment, with a deadline of July 21, 2026. The urgency of this development stems from the pervasive and increasingly sophisticated nature of digital disinformation, amplified by social media platforms and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, which pose a substantial threat to the integrity and fairness of elections. [7, 12, 27]

The draft code represents a proactive and necessary step by the IEC to adapt the country's electoral framework to the realities of the digital age. It acknowledges that for elections to be truly free and fair, the electorate must have access to accurate and trustworthy information, unhindered by deliberate manipulation. The initiative seeks to foster an informed information environment and strengthen resilience against coordinated inauthentic online behaviour, which can erode public trust in democratic institutions and processes. [4, 7, 12, 21]

This article will delve into the statutory and doctrinal underpinnings of the IEC's mandate, analyse the key provisions and implications of the draft code, and consider the challenges and opportunities it presents for practitioners. The central thesis is that the draft Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation is an indispensable instrument for fortifying South Africa's electoral democracy against modern threats, requiring careful consideration to ensure its effectiveness while upholding fundamental constitutional rights.

The Electoral Commission of South Africa is an independent constitutional institution established under Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and further regulated by the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. Its primary mandate is to manage elections for national, provincial, and local legislative bodies, ensuring that these elections are free and fair. [2, 8, 11, 13] This mandate inherently includes protecting the electoral process from undue influence, a challenge that has intensified with the proliferation of digital platforms. [24]

Existing South African electoral legislation already contains provisions addressing false information. Section 89(2) of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 prohibits any person from publishing false information with the intention of disrupting or preventing an election, creating hostility or fear to influence the outcome, or generally influencing the conduct or outcome of an election. [3, 15, 18, 23] Similarly, Section 69(2) of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 contains analogous prohibitions. [10, 27] The general Electoral Code of Conduct, contained in Schedule 1 of the Electoral Act, also prohibits parties and candidates from publishing false or defamatory allegations in connection with an election. [3, 18]

However, the rapid evolution of digital and social media, coupled with the emergence of generative artificial intelligence, has introduced new complexities. Disinformation campaigns can now reach massive audiences almost instantaneously, often overwhelming traditional oversight mechanisms and exploiting the nuances of online behaviour. [3, 15, 19, 20, 22, 26] Recognising these challenges, the IEC has previously engaged in initiatives such as the Real411 platform, in partnership with Media Monitoring Africa, to allow the public to report digital harms, and has signed Memoranda of Understanding with major social media companies to address the spread of harmful content. [14, 16, 23, 24, 26] The current draft code builds upon these efforts, aiming to provide a more comprehensive and legally binding framework.

The draft Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation is designed to give practical effect to constitutional rights, including freedom of expression (Section 16) and political rights (Section 19), while reinforcing existing legal prohibitions against intentionally false election-related information. [7, 12, 27] Its scope extends to all election-related communications, conduct, and campaign activities, both online and offline, encompassing paid and unpaid content. [27] A core objective is to guide political parties, candidates, public representatives, and other influential actors on the reasonable standard of conduct expected in guarding against and responding to disinformation that threatens electoral integrity. [5, 6, 7, 12]

A significant focus of the draft code is on the digital environment. It specifically addresses content disseminated through social media platforms, messaging applications, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. [4, 5, 12, 21, 27] Notably, the code requires parties and candidates to undertake measures to monitor content on their own or associated online platforms, including user-generated content, to identify disinformation and take rapid action to publicly correct and limit its further spread. [4] Furthermore, it mandates the labelling of AI-generated content, prohibits the use of technologies that amplify disinformation, and requires parties to keep records of disinformation disseminated by or on their behalf. [4, 27]

While the code aims to strengthen electoral integrity, its implementation will require a delicate balance with the constitutional right to freedom of expression. The definition of 'disinformation' within the code is crucial, as it must be precise enough to target harmful content without stifling legitimate political debate, satire, or criticism. [3, 17] The IEC's Chairperson, Mosotho Moepya, has highlighted concerns about the rise of generative AI and its potential for "hyper-local" disinformation and deepfakes in the upcoming 2026 Local Government Elections, underscoring the urgency and complexity of this regulatory challenge. [22] The Electoral Court, established under the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, will play a vital role in adjudicating disputes and appeals related to the interpretation and enforcement of this code, ensuring consistency and fairness. [11]

The draft Electoral Code of Conduct on Countering Disinformation represents a pivotal moment for South Africa's electoral democracy, offering a robust framework to address the evolving threats posed by digital manipulation. Its successful implementation will be crucial for fostering an informed electorate and maintaining public trust in the electoral process, particularly as the country gears up for the 2026 Local Government Elections. The IEC's proactive stance in engaging with these complex issues, from AI-generated content to online platform accountability, demonstrates a commitment to safeguarding democratic principles in an increasingly digital world.

For legal practitioners, this draft code signals a new era of heightened responsibility for political parties, candidates, and their affiliates regarding online conduct. Attorneys advising these stakeholders must familiarise themselves with the proposed obligations, including content monitoring, rapid correction protocols, and the ethical use of digital technologies. The public comment period, closing on July 21, 2026, offers a critical opportunity for all interested parties to contribute to shaping a comprehensive, enforceable, and constitutionally compliant framework. The finalisation and subsequent enforcement of this code will undoubtedly set precedents for how disinformation is combated in future elections, making its development a key area to watch for all legal professionals engaged with electoral law and digital governance.