Forjoe

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recently issued a significant decision in *Matter of Francis Jude Forjoe*, 29 I&N Dec. 463 (BIA 2026), clarifying the interpretation of the phrase “at the time of admission” within section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). Overruling its prior precedent in *Matter of Agour*, the BIA held that this phrase refers exclusively to an alien’s lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer, thereby excluding adjustment of status from its scope. This ruling substantially narrows the availability of the INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver for misrepresentation, particularly for individuals who committed fraud during the adjustment of status process, and will apply prospectively.

The landscape of U.S. immigration law, particularly concerning waivers for misrepresentation, has undergone a significant shift with the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) recent decision in *Matter of Francis Jude Forjoe*, 29 I&N Dec. 463 (BIA 2026). This precedential ruling directly addresses the interpretation of “at the time of admission” as it applies to the waiver of deportability under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). The BIA's clarification has profound implications for non-citizens in removal proceedings who seek to waive grounds of deportability stemming from fraud or misrepresentation.

In *Forjoe*, the BIA explicitly overturned its 2015 decision in *Matter of Agour*, which had previously held that adjustment of status constituted an “admission” for the purposes of this specific waiver. The new interpretation significantly narrows the applicability of the INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver, limiting it strictly to misrepresentations made at the point of physical entry into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. This article will delve into the statutory framework, analyze the BIA's reasoning in *Forjoe*, and discuss the critical implications for immigration practitioners and their clients.

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides various grounds for inadmissibility and deportability. Central to the *Forjoe* decision is INA § 237(a)(1)(H), which offers a discretionary waiver of deportability for certain aliens who were inadmissible at the time of admission due to fraud or misrepresentation under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i). This waiver is a crucial form of relief, particularly because inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation can otherwise attach to an alien for life.

To qualify for a § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver, an applicant must generally demonstrate a qualifying relationship (spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident), have been in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document at the time of admission, and have been otherwise admissible to the United States except for the misrepresentation itself. Notably, unlike some other waivers, it does not require a showing of extreme hardship. Prior to *Forjoe*, the BIA's decision in *Matter of Agour*, 26 I&N Dec. 566 (BIA 2015), had interpreted “at the time of admission” broadly to include both initial entry and adjustment of status, providing a safety valve for individuals who committed fraud during the adjustment process.

The BIA in *Matter of Forjoe* meticulously re-examined the statutory language of INA § 237(a)(1)(H) and its legislative history. The Board concluded that the plain and natural meaning of “admission” refers solely to a lawful entry into the United States following inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. This interpretation explicitly excludes the process of adjustment of status from the ambit of “admission” for the purposes of this specific waiver. The BIA reasoned that Congress's amendment of the statute, changing “entry” to “admission,” was a conforming amendment rather than an intent to substantively broaden the waiver's scope to include adjustment of status.

This decision marks a significant departure from the *Agour* precedent, which had allowed for the waiver of fraud committed during adjustment of status. The BIA's shift aligns with a stricter approach to immigration fraud, emphasizing the importance of full and accurate disclosure at every stage of the immigration process. The Board also invoked the Supreme Court's decision in *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, which abolished the *Chevron* doctrine, allowing for a re-examination of agency precedent, even if it overturns a prior interpretation favorable to non-citizens.

The practical effect of *Forjoe* is a substantial narrowing of relief options. Individuals who committed misrepresentation during their adjustment of status will no longer be able to avail themselves of the INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver. This means that while fraud at the time of physical entry might still qualify for the waiver, fraud during an adjustment of status will not. This distinction is critical, as it forces practitioners to consider alternative, often more stringent, forms of relief, such as the INA § 212(i) waiver, which requires a showing of “extreme hardship” to a qualifying U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent.

The BIA's decision in *Matter of Forjoe* represents a pivotal moment in the interpretation of immigration waivers for misrepresentation. By definitively limiting “at the time of admission” in INA § 237(a)(1)(H) to lawful physical entry, the Board has significantly curtailed a previously available avenue of relief for individuals who committed fraud during the adjustment of status process. While the decision applies prospectively, preserving reliance on *Agour* for past cases, its impact on future removal proceedings is undeniable.

Practitioners must now meticulously analyze the timing of any misrepresentation in their clients' immigration histories. For those facing deportability charges due to fraud during adjustment of status, the INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver is no longer a viable option. Attorneys should thoroughly explore other potential waivers, such as INA § 212(i), and be prepared to demonstrate the more demanding “extreme hardship” standard where applicable. This ruling underscores the critical importance of accurate and complete disclosure throughout all immigration applications and necessitates a re-evaluation of defense strategies in removal proceedings involving misrepresentation.