Ex-Mbarara CAO demands Shs 300m from district PAC chair over alleged defamation

A former Mbarara district Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), David Muhwezi, has initiated a civil defamation claim seeking Shs 300 million in compensation from Herbert Kamugisha, the chairperson of the Mbarara District Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The claim stems from alleged defamatory statements made by Kamugisha during a PAC sitting on June 16, 2026. This case highlights the delicate balance between the right to reputation and the imperative of public accountability, particularly concerning statements made by officials in oversight bodies. It will likely test the scope of parliamentary and qualified privilege in Uganda, especially within the context of local government committees, following the recent abolition of criminal defamation in the country.

The recent demand for Shs 300 million in compensation by former Mbarara District Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) David Muhwezi from Herbert Kamugisha, the chairperson of the Mbarara District Public Accounts Committee (PAC), over alleged defamatory statements, brings into sharp focus the intricate interplay between individual reputation and public accountability in Uganda. The statements in question were reportedly made during a sitting of the Mbarara District Public Accounts Committee on June 16, 2026, placing the proceedings of local government oversight bodies under judicial scrutiny. This development underscores the potential legal risks faced by public officials, particularly those engaged in oversight functions, when making pronouncements during official duties.

This case is particularly significant in the current Ugandan legal landscape, which has recently seen the Constitutional Court declare criminal defamation unconstitutional. With the avenue of criminal prosecution for defamation now closed, civil claims for damages remain the primary recourse for individuals alleging reputational harm. The Muhwezi v. Kamugisha dispute will undoubtedly serve as a crucial test for the application of defamation law principles, including the defenses of absolute and qualified privilege, within the unique context of local government Public Accounts Committees. It compels legal professionals to re-evaluate the boundaries of free speech for accountability actors and the protections afforded to those scrutinizing public expenditure.

Defamation law in Uganda is primarily governed by common law principles, supplemented by statutory provisions, notably the Penal Code Act, Cap. 120. Historically, both civil and criminal defamation existed, but a landmark ruling by the Constitutional Court in March 2026 declared Sections 162 and 163 of the Penal Code Act, which defined libel and defamatory matter, unconstitutional, effectively abolishing criminal defamation in Uganda. Consequently, claims for reputational harm are now exclusively pursued through civil litigation, seeking monetary compensation for damages. A defamatory matter is defined as that which is likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing them to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or likely to damage their profession or trade by an injury to their reputation.

Central to the present case is the role of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). In Uganda, Public Accounts Committees exist at both national and local government levels. The Local Government Public Accounts Committees (LGPACs) are established under Sections 88(7-9) of the Local Governments Act, Cap. 243, and Sections 16(1) and (2) of the Local Governments (Financial & Accounting) Regulations, 2007. Their mandate includes examining reports from the Auditor General, Chief Internal Auditor, and commissions of inquiry, scrutinizing financial irregularities, summoning accounting officers, and recommending actions such as recovery of funds or sanctions. These committees are vital instruments of financial oversight and accountability, tasked with ensuring prudent use of public funds at the local government level. The statements made by a PAC chairperson during a committee sitting, therefore, occur within a context of official duty and public interest.

For David Muhwezi to succeed in his civil defamation claim, he must prove that the statements made by Herbert Kamugisha were defamatory, referred to him, and were published to a third party. A statement is considered defamatory if it lowers the plaintiff's reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. Given the context of a PAC meeting, the statements were undoubtedly published. The core of the legal battle will likely revolve around the defamatory nature of the statements and, crucially, the availability and scope of defenses, particularly privilege.

The primary defenses available to Kamugisha would be justification (truth) or privilege. Under Ugandan law, if the defendant can prove that the defamatory matter is true and that it was for the public benefit that it should be published, then the publication is not unlawful. The burden of proof for truth lies with the defendant. However, the most pertinent defense in this scenario is likely to be privilege. Defamation law recognizes two forms of privilege: absolute and qualified. Absolute privilege provides complete immunity from liability, regardless of falsity or malice, and typically applies to statements made in parliamentary or judicial proceedings. The question here is whether a District Public Accounts Committee sitting, while performing an oversight function, qualifies for absolute privilege akin to the national Parliament or a court of law. While some jurisdictions extend absolute privilege to quasi-judicial bodies, the specific application to local government PACs in Uganda may be a point of contention. The Penal Code Act, Section 183(1), grants absolute privilege to matters published by Parliament or in Parliament by members.

If absolute privilege does not apply, Kamugisha may rely on qualified privilege. Qualified privilege protects statements made where there is a moral, social, or legal duty to communicate information, and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving it, or where the publisher has a legitimate interest in making a communication to a relevant authority. This defense is often invoked in cases involving reports of misconduct to appropriate authorities. Given the PAC's mandate to scrutinize public expenditure and hold officials accountable, statements made in the course of such duties would generally fall under qualified privilege. However, unlike absolute privilege, qualified privilege can be defeated if the claimant proves that the defendant acted with malice. Malice, in this context, means the defendant knew the statement was false, was reckless as to its truth or falsity, or had an improper dominant motive, such as personal spite or ill-will. The substantial amount of Shs 300 million sought by Muhwezi suggests that the alleged defamatory statements were perceived to have caused significant reputational and potentially professional damage, and the court will consider the gravity of the statements and their impact when assessing damages, should liability be established. Past cases involving public officials have seen substantial awards, highlighting the high stakes involved.

The defamation claim brought by former Mbarara CAO David Muhwezi against PAC chairperson Herbert Kamugisha presents a critical juncture for Ugandan jurisprudence on public accountability and freedom of expression. For practitioners, this case underscores the imperative for public officials, particularly those in oversight roles like PAC members, to exercise caution and ensure that statements made during official proceedings are factually sound and made without malice. While the abolition of criminal defamation has removed the threat of imprisonment, the potential for substantial civil damages remains a potent deterrent against reckless pronouncements.

Legal professionals will keenly watch how Ugandan courts interpret the scope of privilege, particularly whether the proceedings of local government Public Accounts Committees attract absolute or qualified privilege. The outcome will have significant implications for how local government oversight bodies operate, balancing their crucial role in combating corruption and ensuring accountability against the individual's right to a good reputation. This case serves as a timely reminder of the need for robust legal advice for public officials and a careful consideration of defenses in defamation actions, especially where public interest and official duty intersect.