Ansah Cast Adrift As Malawi's Vice-Presidency Slips Deeper Into Constitutional Limbo

Abstract
Malawi's Vice-Presidency continues to be mired in constitutional ambiguity, with incumbents frequently finding themselves in a "political purgatory" despite the office's formal constitutional recognition. This article examines the historical context and statutory framework underpinning the First Vice-President's role, highlighting how a lack of clearly delineated powers beyond presidential assistance and succession has consistently led to political marginalisation. The current predicament of First Vice-President Jane Ansah, reportedly stripped of key portfolios and sidelined, exemplifies a recurring pattern across successive administrations, raising critical questions about governance, accountability, and the effective functioning of the executive branch in Malawi.
Introduction
The office of the Vice-President in Malawi has long been characterised by a peculiar paradox: an institution enshrined with significant constitutional weight, yet often devoid of practical authority. This enduring state of "constitutional limbo" has seen numerous occupants of the office, including the current First Vice-President Jane Ansah, navigate a landscape where their roles are more symbolic than substantive. The recent reports detailing Ansah's alleged sidelining, including the stripping of her ministerial portfolios and the delegation of her customary duties to other officials, underscore a deeply entrenched issue within Malawi's executive architecture.
Background
The constitutional framework for the Vice-Presidency in Malawi was established with the advent of multiparty democracy in 1994. Section 79 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi provides for a First Vice-President and, subject to Section 80(5), a Second Vice-President, both tasked with assisting the President and exercising powers and functions conferred by the Constitution, an Act of Parliament, or by the President. The First Vice-President is elected concurrently with the President on the same ballot, signifying a joint mandate. However, the constitutional drafters, many with their own presidential aspirations, are often cited as having intentionally created an "impotent vice presidency" to prevent the sharing of real executive power.
Crucially, while the First Vice-President's tenure is tied to the President's term and they cannot be dismissed by the President, requiring an impeachment process by Parliament for specific high crimes, their day-to-day functions remain largely undefined. This contrasts sharply with the President's power to remove the Second Vice-President. The primary explicit constitutional role for the First Vice-President, beyond general assistance, is to assume the presidency in the event of the President's death or incapacity. This structural design has historically set the stage for friction and marginalisation, as presidents often prefer to delegate substantive responsibilities to ministers rather than their deputies, effectively reducing the Vice-President to a ceremonial figurehead.
Analysis
The inherent vagueness in the constitutional definition of the Vice-President's powers, particularly Section 79's broad statement that they "assist the President" and perform functions "conferred... by the President," has been a persistent source of tension. This discretionary power vested in the President, further reinforced by Section 89(6) which allows the President to delegate powers in writing to any Cabinet minister or government official, has consistently been leveraged to sideline Vice-Presidents. The result is an office with constitutional security against arbitrary removal, yet vulnerable to political emasculation through the withholding of portfolios and substantive duties.
Historical accounts corroborate this pattern, with numerous former Vice-Presidents describing their tenures as challenging. Justin Malewezi, the first Vice-President in the multiparty era, resigned due to strained relations with President Bakili Muluzi. Joyce Banda, despite being constitutionally next in line, faced attempts to block her succession after President Bingu wa Mutharika's death, highlighting the fragility of even the succession aspect of the office when political will is absent. Subsequent Vice-Presidents, including Cassim Chilumpha and Saulos Chilima, have publicly lamented the lack of defined roles and the experience of political isolation. The current situation with First Vice-President Jane Ansah, reportedly stripped of her Disaster Management and Public Service Reforms portfolios, is therefore not an anomaly but a continuation of a deeply ingrained executive practice.
This consistent marginalisation has significant implications for good governance. It can lead to a lack of continuity in policy, as Vice-Presidents are often excluded from key decision-making processes, and creates an environment where the second-highest office in the land is underutilised. Furthermore, the political instability arising from strained presidential-vice-presidential relations can distract from national priorities and undermine public confidence in the executive. While the Constitution provides for the Vice-President to be a member of Cabinet (Section 92), the practical reality of their influence within that body is often dictated by the President's discretion.
Calls for constitutional reform to clearly define the Vice-President's functions have been made by various political figures, including former Vice-President Saulos Chilima and former President Lazarus Chakwera, who acknowledged the historical mistreatment of deputies. The ongoing debate, even extending to suggestions of abolishing the office, underscores the profound dissatisfaction with its current operational reality. Without legislative or judicial intervention to clarify and strengthen the Vice-President's mandate, the office risks remaining a symbolic position, perpetually caught in a constitutional and political limbo.
Conclusion
The persistent constitutional limbo surrounding Malawi's Vice-Presidency presents a significant challenge to the country's democratic governance. While the Constitution clearly establishes the office and outlines its role in presidential succession, the lack of specific, enforceable duties beyond assisting the President has rendered it susceptible to political marginalisation. The experience of First Vice-President Jane Ansah, mirroring that of her predecessors, highlights the urgent need for a re-evaluation of the office's mandate.
For legal practitioners, this situation underscores the importance of scrutinising the precise wording of constitutional provisions and understanding the interplay between statutory law and political practice. Advising clients on executive authority and succession requires a nuanced appreciation of both the letter of the law and the historical realities of its application. Moving forward, legislative action to clearly delineate the Vice-President's functions, or potentially a landmark judicial interpretation clarifying the scope of their constitutional role, would be crucial steps towards ensuring that the office serves its intended purpose as a vital component of a robust and accountable executive.
Citations
- 1.Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994
- 2.Section 79, Constitution of the Republic of Malawi
- 3.Section 80(5), Constitution of the Republic of Malawi
- 4.Section 89(6), Constitution of the Republic of Malawi
- 5.Section 92, Constitution of the Republic of Malawi
