Ansah cast adrift as Malawi’s vice‑presidency slips deeper into constitutional limbo

Malawi's First Vice-Presidency has historically been plagued by constitutional ambiguity, leading to a recurring pattern of political marginalisation and disempowerment. The current situation of First Vice-President Jane Ansah, stripped of her portfolios in Disaster Management and Public Service Reforms, exemplifies this enduring challenge. While the Constitution of Malawi grants the President broad powers of delegation, allowing for the bypassing of the Vice-President, it simultaneously enshrines the office as a critical component of executive succession and governance. This article examines the constitutional framework governing the Vice-Presidency, analyses the legal implications of the President's discretionary powers, and highlights the persistent calls for reforms to clarify the role and functions of the office, which remains a source of political instability and legal uncertainty for practitioners.

The office of the Vice-President in Malawi has long been described as a "political purgatory," an institution imbued with constitutional significance yet frequently devoid of practical authority. This enduring paradox is once again evident in the predicament of First Vice-President Jane Ansah, who, despite maintaining her formal duties and Cabinet attendance, has been effectively sidelined through the stripping of her key portfolios in Disaster Management and Public Service Reforms. This development is not an isolated incident but rather a continuation of a deeply entrenched pattern that has characterised the relationship between successive Malawian Presidents and their deputies since the advent of multi-party democracy in 1994.

The constitutional framework for the executive in Malawi is primarily laid out in Chapter VIII of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. Section 78 establishes the President as the Head of State and Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. Section 79 provides for the existence of a First Vice-President and, subject to Section 80(5), a Second Vice-President, both of whom are mandated to assist the President and exercise powers and functions conferred by the Constitution, any Act of Parliament, and by the President. The First Vice-President is elected concurrently with the President on the same ballot paper, underscoring the joint mandate. Crucially, the Constitution provides that the First Vice-President assumes the presidency in the event of a vacancy or acts as President during the President's incapacity. However, the specific day-to-day functions and portfolios of the Vice-President are largely left to the discretion of the President. Section 89(6) of the Constitution explicitly states that the President's powers and functions may be exercised personally or delegated in writing to a member of the Cabinet or a government official. This broad delegation power forms the legal basis for Presidents to assign or withdraw portfolios, often leading to the marginalisation of their deputies. Historically, this constitutional flexibility has contributed to what is colloquially known as the "curse of the vice-presidency," where deputies frequently find themselves in a state of disempowerment, leading to political friction and instability. Previous Vice-Presidents, such as Justin Malewezi, Cassim Chilumpha, and Saulos Chilima, have all experienced periods of being sidelined or facing politically motivated charges after falling out with their respective presidents.

The current situation with First Vice-President Jane Ansah, where she has been stripped of her portfolios in Disaster Management and Public Service Reforms, highlights the inherent tension within Malawi's executive structure. While the President's actions are often perceived as politically motivated, legal experts generally agree that such delegation or withdrawal of portfolios falls within the ambit of presidential discretion as provided by Section 89(6) of the Constitution. This provision grants the President considerable latitude in assigning duties, allowing for the delegation of functions to any Cabinet minister or government official, effectively bypassing the Vice-President without breaching the letter of the law. The implication for legal practitioners is that challenging such a decision purely on constitutional grounds, absent a clear violation of a specifically enumerated Vice-Presidential duty, would be difficult. The Vice-President's constitutionally protected functions are primarily related to succession and acting as President during incapacity, as outlined in Sections 84 and 87. Beyond these, the role is largely defined by presidential assignment. The Public Service Act (Chapter 1:03) and the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act (Cap. 33:05), which govern the portfolios previously held by Ansah, typically vest ministerial powers in the relevant Minister, who is appointed by the President. The President's power to appoint and dismiss Ministers under Section 94(1) further reinforces this executive control. However, it is crucial to distinguish between the President's power to delegate and the inability to remove the First Vice-President from office. Unlike the Second Vice-President, whom the President can remove, the First Vice-President can only be removed through an impeachment process initiated by Parliament, requiring a two-thirds affirmative vote on grounds of serious constitutional violation or breach of law. This safeguard, intended to ensure stability and a balance of power, ironically contributes to the "limbo" state, where a disempowered Vice-President cannot be easily dismissed, yet also lacks constitutionally guaranteed executive functions beyond succession. The repeated calls for constitutional reform to clearly define the Vice-President's functions, echoed by former Vice-Presidents and even Presidents, underscore the recognition of this structural flaw. The current legal framework, while granting presidential flexibility, inadvertently fosters an environment where political expediency can undermine the effectiveness and dignity of a constitutionally established office, leading to perceptions of moral wrongness even when legally permissible.

The constitutional limbo surrounding Malawi's Vice-Presidency, as exemplified by the situation of First Vice-President Jane Ansah, presents a complex challenge for legal practitioners and the broader governance landscape. While the President's actions in stripping portfolios are largely defensible under the broad delegation powers of Section 89(6) of the Constitution, the persistent pattern of marginalisation highlights a significant structural weakness. For attorneys advising executive officeholders or contemplating constitutional challenges, it is imperative to recognise the limited scope of constitutionally entrenched powers for the Vice-President beyond succession. Any legal strategy must navigate the distinction between what is constitutionally permissible and what constitutes sound political practice or protocol. The recurring cycle of disempowerment underscores the urgent need for constitutional amendments that would clearly delineate the functions and responsibilities of the Vice-Presidency, thereby providing greater certainty and stability to the executive branch. Without such reforms, the office risks remaining a symbolic position, vulnerable to political machinations, and perpetually caught in a state of constitutional ambiguity.